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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of retailer store
brand introduction to the upstream manufacturer, channel quality disclosure
and the overall distribution channel efficiency. Chapter 2 studies the retailer
brand introduction strategy with consumer evaluation cost. In the market
place, there is a growing trend for retailers to introduce premium store brands
to complement manufacturer brands. In this chapter, I study the effects of a
retailer premium brand on the profitability of a manufacturer and a retailer
when consumers do not have full information about the brands and have to
incur a cost to evaluate the products. I show that a manufacturer can benefit
when the retailer introduces a retailer brand, and the benefit may increase
with the rising popularity of the retailer brand. This happens when the
introduction of a retailer brand motivates the retailer to induce consumer
evaluation and the manufacturer can take advantage of that to charge a
high wholesale price for the manufacturer brand. Depending on the level of
consumer evaluation cost, a retailer brand is more likely to be introduced
in either a decentralized or a centralized channel. Furthermore, consumer
welfare can be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel.
Chapter 3 studies the benefits of a decentralized channel with voluntary
quality disclosure. Traditional distribution channel literature suggests that
a centralized channel structure is more efficient than a decentralized channel
structure. In this chapter, I find that a decentralized channel can some-
times outperform a centralized channel structure, and the aggregated chan-
nel profit in a decentralized channel can be higher disregarding the negative
impact from channel double marginalization. This occurs when the product
quality information is private and the manufacturer incurs a substantial cost
to disclose product quality information. I also show that the distribution
of product quality plays a role in shaping consumer beliefs about product
quality, leading to a more efficient decentralized channel performance.
ii
Chapter 4 combines chapter 2 and chapter 3 to study the quality disclosure
strategy with a store brand introduction. In chapter 3, I study a manufac-
turer’s strategy to disclose product quality with a passive retailer. In this
essay, I extend the model to investigate the strategic quality disclosure from
both a manufacturer and a retailer when the retailer introduces a retailer
brand. I find that a manufacturer has reduced incentive to conduct quality
disclosure with a store brand introduction. This incentive is also affected
by asymmetric disclosure costs as well as the average retailer brand quality.
Unlike in the competition case, the retailer chooses a disclosure strategy to
leverage the sales for both manufacturer brand and the retailer, leading to
a higher incentive to disclose when the disclosure costs are the same. The
profit and channel efficiency implications are also discussed.
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In this dissertation, I study different types of information asymmetry at
different levels and how firms, an upstream manufacturer and a downstream
retailer, in a decentralized distribution channel work to resolve or promote
this information asymmetry in order to obtain optimal individual payoffs.
The first essay (chapter 2) deals with consumer level information uncer-
tainty regarding product preferences. The seller has incentive to induce con-
sumer evaluation to resolve their preference uncertainties in order to exploit
the elevated willingness to pay from consumers. The conduct to facilitate
consumer evaluation depends on the cost of evaluation and the size of the
demand segment. The second essay (chapter 3) examines the manufacturer
level quality information asymmetry and the manufacturers decision to dis-
close the private information of product quality. Unlike the consumers who
are passively induced by sellers to resolve information uncertainty in chapter
2, the manufacturer undertakes an active part leveraging information revela-
tion and product pricing to shape the perception of product quality received
by buyers. The likelihood of quality disclosure depends on the public in-
formation of the quality distribution and more importantly, the structure of
product distribution. In the third essay (chapter 4), the retailer can introduce
a retailer brand to affect the quality disclosure intention from the manufac-
turer. There are two levels of information uncertainties, the manufacturer
level and the retailer level. The incentive for a channel member to disclose
product quality is not only a reaction to shape buyer perception of product
quality, but also to manage the competition intensity between the manufac-
turer and the retailer. In reality, the three levels of information uncertainty
may coexist in any distribution channel. This dissertation singles out the
different types of information asymmetry into three essays to help with the
understanding of the information dissemination in distribution channels.
The dissertation also illustrates how different marketing mix helps to re-
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duce information asymmetry and to direct buyers purchase decisions. In
chapter 2, the product variety and pricing strategies impact consumers ex-
pected payoff from conducting evaluation to resolve preference uncertainty
and their reservation price for a preferred product. In chapter 3, buyers
can infer the product quality from the channel structure and quality adver-
tising activity from the manufacturer. In chapter 4, the quality disclosure
activities from both the manufacturer and the retailer determine how buyers
perceive the product quality from a manufacturer brand and a retailer brand
respectively. Although the cost to resolve information uncertainty does not
add to the social surplus since all the gains are all private, the matching








In many product categories, there is a growing trend for retailers to introduce
premium store brands. Unlike traditional copycat store brands, these pre-
mium retailer brands offer high quality and represent unique products which
are differentiated explicitly from manufacturer brands in the same product
category. For instance, Sears offers premium branded home appliances such
as Kenmore, Diehard and Craftsman, with unique product features and de-
sign. Macy’s launches several product lines in clothing, such as Style&co,
Alfani and Charter Club, to target consumers with different lifestyles. Su-
permarket retailer Kroger introduces the “Disney Magic” product line of
child-oriented food, and Whole Foods also sells its premium brand “365 Ev-
eryday Value” and “365 Organic Everyday Value”. Premium store brands
are an important source of revenue to retailers. JCPenney, for example, has
a very high level of store brand penetration accounting for 40 percent of its
sales Kumar and Steenkamp (2007).
Premium store brands, on the one hand, complement the brands from
manufacturers by choosing unique product positioning and targeting hetero-
geneous consumer needs. Sephora, the cosmetic retail chain store, sells the
Sephora store brand as well as manufacturer branded cosmetics. While man-
ufacturer brands offer eyeshadow palettes with limited but popular colors,
the Sephora brand complements them by offering 98 different colors, includ-
ing some unusual ones to satisfy the needs of those niche market consumers.
Sainsbury, the U.K. supermarket giant, sells a “Be Good to Yourself” pre-
mium store brand to target working female consumers, while manufacturer
brands target average consumers. Those premium retailer brands have com-
parable quality but are positioned horizontally different from manufacturer
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brands. This is in contrast with copycat store brands which have inferior
quality and only focus on low prices. On the other hand, the presence of pre-
mium retailer brands makes it more desirable for consumers to refine their
purchase choices by finding out the best matched products. This is especially
the case when consumers do not have full information about the products in
a product category, and have to conduct evaluation through which product
information is collected, processed and evaluated by consumers in order to
find the products matching their needs (Villas-Boas, 2009).1From consumers’
perspectives, the introduction of a complementary retailer brand enriches the
product variety offered in the store and motivates consumers to refine their
purchase choices by finding out the better matched products. This is achieved
by conducting consumer evaluation through which product information is col-
lected, processed and evaluated by consumers in order to discover the exact
value derived from the product upon purchase. By conducting product eval-
uation, consumers become more certain about their brand choice and their
preferences become more heterogeneous. This evaluation is an endogenous
choice of action by consumers and is not always costless (Guo and Zhang,
2010; Kuksov, 2004; Villas-Boas, 2009; Wathieu and Bertini, 2007). In many
cases, consumers need to incur evaluation costs to get full information and
resolve their product value uncertainties. Without this evaluation process,
consumers hold only superficial information of products, such information
includes product prices and relative brand popularities, and they can form
only general preference beliefs based on the information. The action of pur-
chase without evaluation is similar to impulse buying, where the ex post risk
of preference mismatch associated with purchase is high, but the economic
loss is relatively low. In practice, whether consumers initiate product evalu-
ation depends on the cost of evaluation, the expected match/mismatch of a
product, as well as the ex post financial risk associated with purchase. Re-
tailers can thus influence buyers’ product evaluation and purchase decisions
through strategically choosing the brands and the retail prices to offer.
Manufacturers’ reactions to retailer store brands are often mixed. Al-
though a store brand may weaken the manufacturer’s relative marketing
power and intensify price competition in the product category, it may also
1Firms may use advertising or free samples to facilitate consumer evaluation of their
products. However, this does not eliminate consumers’ own efforts to process product
information and evaluate to find their best-matched products.
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expand the existing product assortment and attract more consumers to the
market, which may benefit the manufacturers especially when the retailer
brands and the manufacturer brands are horizontally differentiated and tar-
get different niche markets. As quoted by a category manager, the success of
retailer store brands has benefited major candy and snack suppliers by bring-
ing new customers to the category (Fleenor, 2010). Soberman and Parker
(2006) also find that the launch of a quality-equivalent store brand by a
retailer can benefit both the retailer and the manufacturer.
To study the effects of premium retailer brands, I develop a model of
one manufacturer which sells its product through a retailer. The retailer
has the option to introduce a premium retailer brand which is horizontally
differentiated from the manufacturer’s brand. Consumers have heterogeneous
preferences for the brands, and have to evaluate the brands to find the best
matched product, for which consumers must incur an evaluation cost.
2.1.1 Summary of Results
I have obtained a few interesting results. First, I show that the manufacturer
can, interestingly, benefit from the introduction of a premium retailer brand.
When the retailer introduces a premium retailer brand, it has a stronger
incentive to induce consumer evaluation. This is because the premium re-
tailer brand is horizontally differentiated from the manufacturer brand. After
conducting product evaluation, some consumers will find the retailer brand
better matched with their needs, and the retailer can charge a high retail
price to exploit those consumers. The manufacturer, in turn, can free ride
on the retailer’s efforts to induce consumer evaluation and raise its whole-
sale price to exploit consumers whose needs are better matched with the
manufacturer brand after conducting product evaluation induced by the re-
tailer.This benefiting mechanism is different from that described in the past
literature, which claims that the manufacturer brand only indirectly benefits
from a retailer brand when the retailer brand helps increase store traffic or
create competition against other manufacturer brands (Pauwels and Srini-
vasan, 2004; Sudhir and Talukdar, 2004). I show that the benefit for the
manufacturer happens only when the consumer evaluation cost is low. With
high evaluation cost, the retailer has less incentive to induce consumer evalu-
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ation. Instead, it utilizes the retailer brand to create competition against the
manufacturer brand. In response to the threat of competition, the manufac-
turer has to lower its wholesale price and no longer benefits from the retailer
brand.
Second, I also show that a retailer’s incentive to introduce a retailer brand
depends on the level of consumer evaluation cost. To the retailer, the benefit
of using the retailer brand to induce consumer evaluation decreases, while the
benefit of using the retailer brand as a competitive threat against the man-
ufacturer brand increases with the evaluation cost. With those two effects
combined, the retailer’s incentive to offer the retailer brand first decreases and
then increases with the evaluation cost. In addition, the manufacturer may
become better off when the retailer brand becomes more popular. At equi-
librium, the retailer’s brand introduction strategy is affected by the relative
popularity of the retailer brand. With increasing retailer brand popularity,
the retailer receives a higher profit by introducing the retailer brand, and
may switch from its initial strategy of not introducing a retailer brand to
introducing. This action leads to a greater product variety in the channel
and may benefit the manufacturer.
Third, I show that the retailer brand is more likely to be introduced in
either a centralized channel or a decentralized channel. When the consumer
evaluation cost is low, the retailer brand is more likely to be introduced in
a centralized channel. This is because in a decentralized channel, the man-
ufacturer free rides on the retailer’s efforts to induce consumer evaluation,
which reduces the incentive for the retailer to introduce the retailer brand.
When consumer evaluation cost is high, the retailer brand is more likely to
be introduced in a decentralized channel. This happens when the retailer
strategically uses the retailer brand as a competitive threat against the man-
ufacturer, and such an effect is absent in a centralized channel.
Lastly, I study the welfare implications of premium retailer brand intro-
duction in either a centralized or a decentralized channel. Interestingly, I
find that consumer welfare can be higher in a decentralized channel than in
a centralized one. This happens when the retailer brand is introduced in a
centralized but not in a decentralized channel in equilibrium. In this case,
consumer surpluses are more likely to be exploited when the retailer effec-




This chapter is related to past literature on store brands. Traditionally,
store brands are viewed as the low-quality versions of manufacturer brands
and are usually positioned to copycat their counterpart manufacturer brands
(Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004). For instance, a retailer may want to
introduce a store brand if there is a higher unit margin to be drawn (Raju
et al., 1995; Chintagunta et al., 2002; Sayman et al., 2002; Ailawadi and Har-
lam, 2004; Yehezkel, 2008). The retailer can also rely on the retailer brand
to strengthen its bargaining power (Mills, 1995; Steenkamp and Dekimpe,
1997; Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998; Sudhir, 2001; Meza and Sudhir, 2006).
In recent years, retailers have emphasized the “value” that can be derived
from a retailer brand, and it is claimed that retailer brands may have high
quality and can be used as differentiation tools by retailers (Dhar and Hoch,
1997; Corstjens and Lal, 2000; Bonfrer and Chintagunta, 2004). This chapter
fills the gap by studying the effects of premium retailer brands which have
comparable product quality but are horizontally differentiated from manu-
facturer brands. According to the past literature, manufacturers are usually
negatively impacted by the retailer brands, due to brand cannibalization and
price competition (Connor and Peterson, 1992; Sudhir, 2001; Ailawadi and
Harlam, 2004). Therefore, it is suggested that manufacturers enforce exclu-
sive dealing to prevent the introduction of retailer brands and to protect their
own profits (Yehezkel, 2008; Groznik and Heese, 2010). Some researchers pro-
pose that a retailer brand might positively affect a manufacturer brand by
attracting more one-stop shoppers (Geylani et al., 2009) or creating com-
petition against other more susceptible manufacturer brands (Pauwels and
Srinivasan, 2004; Sudhir and Talukdar, 2004). This only suggests that a man-
ufacturer brand might indirectly benefit from the retailer brand introduction
when there are other market externalities. That a retailer can strategically
induce consumer evaluation after introducing a retailer brand and its im-
pact on the manufacturer-retailer relationship have not been explored. In
this paper, we propose a new mechanism through which a retailer brand
introduction may benefit the manufacturer.
Researchers have long realized that consumers need to incur a search cost
or an evaluation cost to resolve purchase uncertainties when they lack product
information (Diamond, 1971; Anderson and Renault, 1999; Kuksov, 2004).
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The search or evaluation cost can be interpreted as the time and money
spent by consumers to build their knowledge of the products. Firms can
thus orchestrate product prices and offerings to affect consumer evaluation
behavior. Wathieu and Bertini (2007) consider the pricing of a product with
an additional novel feature, and they demonstrate that with overpricing,
consumers become more willing to think about the possible personal benefits
from the new feature. It is also suggested that there is an optimal number
of alternative products to induce consumer evaluation (Villas-Boas, 2009;
Kuksov and Villas-Boas, 2010), and a firm may choose a long product line to
encourage consumer evaluation or a short product line to prevent consumer
evaluation (Guo and Zhang, 2010). However, that research does not study the
conflicts between a retailer and a manufacturer when the retailer introduces
its premium store brand and how the conflicts are affected by consumer
evaluation behavior.
The results in this chapter also contribute to the literature on product
line design. It has been documented that the product line in a decentralized
channel is shorter than in a centralized channel due to channel inefficiency
(Villas-Boas, 1998). Liu and Cui (2010) show that a manufacturer can pro-
vide either a longer or shorter product line in a decentralized channel than
in a centralized channel, depending on whether or not the market is fully
covered. In this chapter, I further show that whether there is greater prod-
uct variety in a decentralized channel or a centralized channel depends on
consumer evaluation cost.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
basic model setting and studies the impact of consumer evaluation on the
retailer brand introduction strategy as well as the profits of the manufacturer
and the retailer. Section 2.3 discusses the impact of channel structure on
the introduction of a retailer brand and explores the welfare implications
for consumers. Section 2.4 extends the basic model in several directions. I
conclude in section 2.5.
2.2 The Model
I consider an upstream manufacturer that distributes its branded product M
through a downstream retailer. The retailer has an option to introduce its
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own premium retailer brand R at a fixed cost F . The variable production
costs of M and R are normalized to zero. M and R are horizontally differ-
entiated such that some consumers prefer M , and some consumers prefer R.
However, consumers are uncertain about their actual preferences unless they
incur a cost c prior to purchase to evaluate the products.2
Consumers voluntarily make the product evaluation decision. If they
choose to evaluate the products by incurring a cost c, a proportion of α
consumers will find M preferred, and attain a value of 1 from M and 0 from
R. The rest (1−α) will find R preferred, and attain a value of 1 from R and
0 from M . If consumers choose not to evaluate the products, they do not
know whether they prefer M or R, and only hold a general belief that they
will prefer M with probability α and prefer R with probability (1−α). This
setup implicitly assumes that M and R are horizontally differentiated, and
consumers obtain the same value from purchasing their preferred brand, ei-
ther M or R. In the model extension, I study the case where consumers who
prefer R may obtain a lower value. In addition, the parameter α captures
the relative popularity of the manufacturer brand compared with the retailer
brand. In the main model, I focus on the case where the manufacturer brand
is more popular than the retailer brand, where α > 1
2
. The case with α < 1
2
will be discussed in the model extension.
Consumers make a two-stage purchase decision. In the first stage, con-
sumers observe the products available as well as the retail price(s) and decide
whether to incur an evaluation cost c to resolve their preference uncertainty.
I focus on the most interesting case where c < 2α(1−α). In the second stage,
consumers make purchase decisions conditioning on their actions in the first
stage. I define consumers’ action space by {Ei, Ei}. E and E represent con-
sumers’ actions of evaluation and no evaluation in the first stage, and the
subscript i stands for the type of product consumers decide to purchase at
the second stage. For instance, i = {M,R, 0} denotes the purchase of the
manufacturer brand, of the retailer brand, and no purchase.
2In practice, consumers do not always possess expertise in every product category. For
instance, a consumer who is not familiar with organic food prior to purchase may need to
spend time collecting and processing relevant information on this product category, which
helps the consumer figure out the product matching her personal taste. In my model,
the time, effort or money that a consumer spends in building knowledge of the organic
food category is summarized to an evaluation cost c, which is consistent with Villas-Boas
(2009). In the model extension, I will study the case that the evaluation cost c depends
on the number of products in the same product category.
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Figure 2.1: Game sequence
This model assumes that consumers may choose to evaluate both the man-
ufacturer brand and the retailer brand in all occasions, even when consumers
possess some pre-existing knowledge of the manufacturer brand. This as-
sumption is valid for the purchase of durable products where the time be-
tween purchase is long and consumers only have limited experience with each
brand. Even for the more frequently purchased product categories, there is
an evidence for continuous evaluation as consumers undertake a learning
curve to accumulate knowledge (Erdem and Keane, 1996). What is more,
consumers are not always involved in an extensive evaluation all the time.
The extent of evaluation in which consumers are engaged may be affected
when there is a change in the market conditions (Murthi and Srinivasan,
1999). The introduction of a new premium store brands may as well pro-
mote consumer to evaluate the brands more thoroughly. I also assume the
same evaluation cost for all consumers. The case of different evaluation costs
across consumers does not affect the main results qualitatively.
I analyze a three-stage Stackelberg game between the retailer and the
manufacturer (Figure 2.1). In the first stage, the retailer decides whether
to introduce a retailer brand R at a fixed cost F (F ≤ (1 − α)). In the
second stage, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price w for the
manufacturer brand. In the third stage, the retailer decides on the retail
prices for the manufacturer brand pM and the retailer brand pR (if R is
introduced). I examine two subgames with and without the introduction of
R, and compare the retailer’s profits in those two subgames to obtain the
subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.2.1 Manufacturer Brand Only
When the retailer brand R is not introduced, consumers have only limited
purchasing options. When consumers choose to incur an evaluation cost
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c to resolve their preference uncertainty, they only purchase if they find
M is the preferred product with the utility UE = 1 − pM and pM ≤ 1.
Note that consumers have to incur a sunk cost c on product evaluation.
Therefore, at the evaluation stage where consumers are still uncertain about




α(1− pM)− c if pM ≤ 1;
−c otherwise. (2.1)
When consumers do not incur the evaluation cost c to resolve preference
uncertainty, their utility from purchase becomes UE = 1−pM if M turns out
to be their preferred product, and UE = −pM otherwise. Because consumers
do not know their actual preferences without evaluation, their purchase de-
cision is based on the expected value of M . Hence, consumers purchase M
if and only if pM ≤ α. At the evaluation stage, consumers’ expected utility
from not conducting product evaluation becomes
E(UE) =
{
α− pM if pM ≤ α;
0 otherwise.
(2.2)
Consumers make evaluation decisions by comparing their expected payoffs
(E(UE) and E(UE)). For a consumer to choose evaluation, a condition that
must be satisfied is that E(UE) ≥ E(UE). This requires that α(1−pM)−c ≥
α − pM for pM ≤ α; or α(1 − pM) − c ≥ 0 for α < pM ≤ 1. Therefore, if
c ≤ α(1 − α) and c
1−α ≤ pM ≤ 1 − cα , consumers choose to evaluate the
product, and purchase when they find the product preferred (denoted as
EM) or do not purchase when the product is not preferred (denoted as E0).
If pM < min{ c1−α , α}, consumers choose not to evaluate and buy M (denoted
as EM). Otherwise, consumers will neither evaluate nor purchase M .
The retailer can induce consumer evaluation and purchase behavior by
setting an appropriate price pM . When the retailer induces EM , it receives
a profit piR = p
EM
M − w; when the retailer induces EM , it receives piR =
α(pEMM −w). Here, pEMM and pEMM are the retail prices to induce EM and EM
respectively. When c ≤ α(1 − α), the retailer can induce EM by charging a
high price pEMM = 1 − cα . Alternatively, the retailer may charge a low price
pEMM =
c
1−α to induce EM . When c > α(1 − α), evaluation becomes too
expensive to induce, and the retailer charges pEMM = α and consumers will
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purchase without evaluation.
Whether it is optimal for the retailer to induce EM or EM depends on the
wholesale price w. To make the retailer induce EM , the manufacturer should
charge a wholesale price satisfying pEMM − w ≥ max{α(pEMM − w), 0}, which
requires that w ≤ min{ (2−α)c−α(1−α)
(1−α)2 , α}. In this case, the manufacturer
receives a profit piM = w
EM = min{ (2−α)c−α(1−α)
(1−α)2 , α}. Alternatively, to
make the retailer induce EM , the manufacturer should charge a w satisfying
α(pEMM − w) ≥ max{pEMM − w, 0}, and receive piM = αwEM = α − c. Notice
that when c > α(1−α), the evaluation becomes too expensive for consumers,
and consumers will never choose to evaluate.
The manufacturer chooses w to maximize its profit, and the optimal w and
pM are:
wEM = 1− c
α






1−α if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1− α)];
wEM = α, pEMM = α otherwise.
(2.3)
The corresponding channel members’ profits are:







(1−α)2 if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1− α)];
piEMM = α, pi
EM
R = 0 otherwise.
(2.4)
2.2.2 Manufacturer Brand and Retailer Brand
Now I consider the subgame where the retailer introduces R at a fixed cost
F and sells both M and R to consumers. When consumers incur a sunk
cost c to evaluate the products and resolve the preference uncertainty, some
consumers will find M preferred with the utility UE = 1 − pM , others will
find R preferred with the utility UE = 1 − pR. Therefore, a consumer will
purchase M if and only if M is preferred and pM ≤ 1; or she will purchase
R if and only if R is preferred and pR ≤ 1. Accordingly, the expected utility
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from conducting evaluation is:
E(UE) =

α(1− pM − c) + (1− α)(1− pR − c) if pM ≤ 1, pR ≤ 1;
α(1− pM)− c if pM ≤ 1, pR > 1;
(1− α)(1− pR)− c if pM > 1, pR ≤ 1;
−c otherwise.
(2.5)
The utility function suggests that when one of the retail prices is above
consumers’ reservation price (e.g. pi > 1), consumers ignore the presence of
brand i, because the product is not affordable anyway. The problem is then
degenerated to the single product case analyzed previously.
When consumers choose not to incur the evaluation cost to resolve prefer-
ence uncertainty, the expected consumer utility is given by
E(UE) =

α− pM if pM ≤ min{2α− 1 + pR, α};
(1− α)− pR if pR < min{1− 2α + pM , 1− α};
0 otherwise.
(2.6)
Again, consumers will adopt the evaluation and purchasing strategy that
generates the highest nonnegative expected utilities. Therefore, consumers
compare their expected payoffs from E(UE) and E(UE) to determine their
action to evaluate products.
Figure 2.2 illustrates consumers’ evaluation and purchasing decisions as a
function of pM and pR (pM ≤ 1 and pR ≤ 1). Prior to making the prod-
uct evaluation decisions, consumers jointly consider the retail prices of the
two brands to determine their expected payoff with and without product
evaluation. When the retail prices are not balanced (pM − pR > 1 − cα
with pR < (1 − α) or pR − pM > 1 − c1−α with pM < α), i.e. one brand
is significantly cheaper than the other, consumers choose to purchase the
cheaper brand without conducting product evaluation (ER or EM). Upon
evaluation, consumers expect to pay a leveraged price αpM + (1 − α)pR.
Hence, when the retail prices are balanced (αpM + (1 − α)pR ≤ 1 − c and
c
1−α−1 ≤ pM−pR ≤ 1− cα), consumers choose to evaluate the products (Ei).
The overall incentive to evaluate is also related to the evaluation cost. With
an increase of evaluation cost c, consumers have less incentive to evaluate
products. Therefore, the area of {Ei} shrinks; this indicates that it becomes
more difficult to induce consumer evaluation. When c is close to 2α(1− α),
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Figure 2.2: Consumer evaluation and purchase decision at given pM and pR
with c ∈ [α(1− α), 2α(1− α)]. When c increases(decreases), the Ei region
shrinks(expands).
evaluation can never be induced and the {Ei} area is degenerated to a line.
With a decrease of evaluation cost c, consumers are more willing to conduct
product evaluation, and the area of {Ei} expands. At the extreme, when c
approaches zero, consumers will always adopt the evaluation strategy.
Comparing consumers’ evaluation and purchasing strategy under low and
high levels of product variety, I find that consumers are more likely to evalu-
ate with high product variety. Consumers’ expected benefit from conducting
evaluation rises (UE|M&R > UE|M) when they see more brand choices, lead-
ing to higher tolerance of the evaluation cost. For instance, in the absence
of R, consumers will never evaluate when c > α(1 − α). However, with the
presence of R, under proper pricing, consumers will still choose to evaluate
products as long as c ≤ 2α(1 − α). What is more, because there are more
products to meet their heterogeneous preferences, with a high level of product
variety, consumers are better matched with the products after evaluation.
Based on the above rationale, there are four actions that the retailer may
want to induce from consumers: Ei(i = M or R), ER, EM and ER. Again
the retailer can use the prices of M and R to affect consumer evaluation and
purchase behavior. The retailer receives piEiR = α(p
Ei
M −w) + (1− α)pEiR − F ,
piERR = (1 − α)pERR − F , piEMR = pEMM − w − F , and piERR = pERR − F when
each consumer reaction is induced, respectively. The manufacturer foresees
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the retailer’s pricing reactions and chooses w to optimize piM . The optimal
wholesale price is:





if c ∈ (α(1−α)
1+α
, α(1− α)];
wEi = 1− c
α
if c ∈ (α(1− α), 1−α2
2−α ];
wEM = c
1−α − 1 if c ∈ (1−α
2
2−α , 2α(1− α)).
(2.7)
At equilibrium, the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are:
piEiM = α, pi
Ei
R = 1− c− α− F if c ∈ [0, α(1−α)1+α ];
piEiM = 1− 1+αα c, piEiR = cα − F if c ∈ (α(1−α)1+α , α(1− α)];





1−α − 1, piEMR = 1 + α− c1−α − F if c ∈ (1−α
2
2−α , 2α(1− α)).
(2.8)
I compare the manufacturer’s profits before and after the retailer intro-
duces R, and summarize the main result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 The introduction of a retailer brand benefits the manu-
facturer (piM |M&R ≥ piM |M) when 0 < c ≤ α(1−α)α(1−α)2+1 .
Interestingly, I find that the manufacturer can directly benefit when the
retailer introduces the retailer brand. With the introduction of R, the retailer
can charge a high retail price pR to consumers who prefer the retailer brand
after conducting product evaluation. In order to exploit consumer surpluses
for those consumers who prefer R, the retailer has a stronger incentive to
induce consumer evaluation of the products. As a result, the manufacturer
can free ride on the retailer’s incentive, charging a higher wholesale price
for the manufacturer brand and achieving a higher profit with the presence
of the retailer brand. To see this, notice that the manufacturer charges
wEi |M&R = 1 > wEi |M = 1 − cα when 0 < c ≤ α(1−α)1+α , and wEi |M&R =
α−(1+α)c
α2
> wEi |M = 1− cα when α(1−α)1+α < c < α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 .
It is important to note that the manufacturer’s benefit from the retailer
brand comes from the free-riding on the retailer’s efforts to induce consumer
evaluation. When c is sufficiently low (0 < c < α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ), consumers
always evaluate with and without the presence of R. The sole driving force
behind the benefit is that the manufacturer takes advantage of the retailer’s
stronger incentive to induce consumer evaluation after R is introduced.
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This beneficial effect can also be interpreted from the interaction between
the manufacturer and the retailer compensating for the consumer evaluation
cost. Consumers are aware of the sunk cost entailed to conduct product eval-
uation. Therefore they will decline to evaluate if their expected surpluses are
completely exploited through high retail prices. To induce consumer evalua-
tion, the retailer needs to lower the retail prices to subsidize for c, ensuring
that consumers receive nonnegative expected payoffs. In the absence of R,
the retailer lowers pM by
c
α
to compensate for evaluation. With the pres-
ence of R, consumers consider pM and pR jointly before making evaluation
decisions, and the retailer can induce consumer evaluation by lowering the
“leveraged retail price” (αpM + (1 − α)pR) by the amount of c. Because of
the extra profit the retailer can earn by selling R, the retailer predominantly
prefers to induce consumer evaluation Ei even if the manufacturer charges
a high w. Hence, when evaluation cost is low (0 < c < α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ), the
retailer incurs the cost of compensating for consumer evaluation, while the
manufacturer charges a high wholesale price and benefits from the higher
price margin.
I also acknowledge that the manufacturer may benefit from greater con-
sumer evaluation at higher c when R is introduced. Consistent with this
claim, when α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 < c ≤ α(1−α)α(1−α)2+1 , consumers in equilibrium choose
to evaluate products with the presence of both M and R, but not to eval-
uate when there is only M in the market. This implies that although the
manufacturer brand exists before the retailer brand is introduced, consumer
preference uncertainty may not be resolved until a retailer brand is intro-
duced. Therefore, after the retailer brand is introduced, the manufacturer
can charge a higher pM to exploit consumers who prefer M after resolving
their preference uncertainty, and so can make a higher profit.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Introduction of Retailer Brand
I now compare the retailer’s profits before and after the retailer introduces
R to obtain the retailer’s optimal brand introduction decision. The retailer’s
profits before and after R is introduced are given in equation (2.4) and equa-
tion (2.8) respectively. When piR|M&R ≥ piR|M , the retailer chooses to intro-
duce R; when piR|M&R < piR|M the retailer chooses not to introduce R. The
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following proposition summarizes the retailer’s optimal decision on retailer
brand introduction.
Proposition 2.2 In equilibrium, the retailer chooses to introduce R when
c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤ max{1− α − c, cα}, or when c > α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 and
F ≤ α2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α .
(i) The retailer’s incentive to introduce R first decreases then increases
with c when c < α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 .
(ii) The manufacturer can be better off when R becomes more popular (α




The introduction of a retailer brand can benefit the retailer in two ways.
First, the retailer can enjoy the high price margin from R by selling to con-
sumers who prefer R to M after conducting product evaluation, the evalua-
tion effect. Second, the retailer can use the retailer brand to create product
competition against M in order to acquire a lower w from the manufacturer,
the competition effect. Therefore, the retailer’s decision to introduce R de-
pends on whether the benefits exceed the fixed introduction cost F .
When c is low (c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ), the evaluation effect is strong and the
retailer has a stronger incentive to induce consumer evaluation after intro-
ducing the retailer brand. However, recall from proposition 2.1 that the
manufacturer free rides on the retailer’s stronger incentive, and the retailer
has to compensate for the consumer evaluation cost. As c increases, the re-
tailer suffers more from compensating for consumer evaluation cost, which
reduces the benefit from the evaluation effect. Alternatively, the retailer can
switch to the strategy of selling only R without inducing consumer evalua-
tion, leading to a stronger competition effect against M . To account for this
threat, the manufacturer has to motivate the retailer to continue selling M
by charging a lower wholesale price. Since the evaluation effect decreases
with c and the competition effect increases with c, combining the two effects,
I show that the retailer’s incentive to introduce R first decreases and then
increases with c.3
With the introduction of the retailer brand, the manufacturer’s profit
changes from piM |M to piM |M&R, indicating that a change to the equilibrium




1−α +F ) the retailer strategically chooses not to
offer R. Under this condition, the retailer’s profit from selling M alone exceeds that from
selling both M and R.
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product introduction strategy may increase/decrease the manufacturer’s profit.
Therefore, a change of brand popularity (α) which influences the retailer
brand introduction decision may affect the manufacturer profit. Interest-
ingly, the manufacturer can be better off when R becomes more popular,
as shown in proposition 2.2(ii). From the retailer’s perspective, its profit
always increases as R becomes more popular. In the range of evaluation cost
defined in Proposition 2.2(ii), the retailer has an incentive to switch from
not offering R to the strategy of introducing R as (1− α) increases. As dis-
cussed in proposition 2.1, the manufacturer benefits from the introduction of
a retailer brand (piM |M&R > piM |M) when c ≤ α(1−α)α(1−α)2+1 . Therefore, it is not
necessarily bad news for the manufacturer when the retailer brand becomes
more popular among consumers.
2.3 Retailer Brand Introduction and Channel
Structure
In section 2.2, I study the retailer brand introduction strategy in a decen-
tralized channel. In this section, we compare that with a centralized channel
where a manufacturer owns the retailer. In the model, the manufacturer
first decides whether to introduce R in addition to M with a fixed cost F ,
then decides on the retail price(s). As in the previous section, I identify the
equilibrium product introduction strategy by comparing the manufacturer’s
profit before and after introducing R (see the appendix). The manufacturer
chooses to introduce R when F ≤ max{1 − 2−α
1−αc, 1 − c − α, 0}, and the
equilibrium product introduction strategy is illustrated by the thin line in
Figure 2.3.
I now compare the equilibrium product introduction strategy with that in
a decentralized channel. In Figure 2.3, the thin line intersects with the thick
line at three points: point 1, 2 and 3, where c1 < c2 < c3. The three inter-


























Figure 2.3: Retailer brand introduction strategy with α = 0.6. The thick




A : max{1− α− c, c
α
} ≤ F ≤ 1− 2−α
1−αc, c < c1;
B : 1− 2−α
1−αc ≤ F ≤ cα , c1 ≤ c < c2;
C : max{1− 2−α
1−αc, 1− α− c} ≤ F ≤ α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α , c > c3;
D : α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α ≤ F ≤ 1− 2−α1−αc, c2 ≤ c ≤ c3.
(2.9)
The following proposition summarizes the main findings:
Proposition 2.3 The retailer brand R is more (less) likely to be introduced
in a centralized channel than in a decentralized channel in regions A and D
(B and C).
Interestingly, proposition 2.3 shows that R is more likely to be introduced
in either a centralized or a decentralized channel. In the region defined by A
where the evaluation cost is low (c ≤ c1), the manufacturer in a decentralized
channel takes advantage of retailer compensation for the evaluation cost,
lowering the retailer’s incentive to introduce R. However, in a centralized
channel, there is not such interaction between the manufacturer and the
retailer, and R is more likely to be introduced. In regions defined by B and
C where the evaluation cost is high, R is more likely to be introduced in
a decentralized channel than in a centralized one. This is due to the fact
that the retailer in a decentralized channel can rely on the competition effect
brought in by R in order to acquire a low w from the manufacturer when c is
high. However, in the centralized channel, this motivation is absent. R is also
more likely to be introduced in the centralized channel in the region defined
by D. In this region, the retailer in the decentralized channel strategically
chooses not to introduce R, which allows the retailer to benefit from the
manufacturer’s incentive to lower the wholesale price in order to align the
retailer’s incentive on consumer evaluation.
I also study the welfare implications of retailer brand introduction under
different channel structures. Consumer welfare is defined by the utility gain
from purchasing a product, subtracting the price paid. Without consumer
evaluation, the overall consumer welfare is defined by CSE = α−pM if EM is
induced, or CSE = (1−α)−pR if ER is induced. With consumer evaluation,
the consumer welfare becomes CSEi = 1 − αpM − (1 − α)pR − c if R is
introduced, or CSEM = α(1− pM)− c if R is not introduced.
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In a decentralized channel, consumer welfare is:
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ [0, α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 ];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = α− c1−α if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1− α)];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ (α(1− α), 1−α22−α ];
CSEM |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ (1−α22−α , 2α(1− α)).
(2.10)
In a centralized channel, consumer welfare is:
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ [0, α(1−α)2−α ];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = α− c1−α if c ∈ (α(1−α)2−α , α(1− α)];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ (α(1− α), 2α(1− α)).
(2.11)
I compare consumer welfare in a decentralized channel with that in a central-
ized channel, and report the most interesting result in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2.4 Consumer welfare is higher in a decentralized channel
than in a centralized channel when α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c − α1−α ≤ F ≤ 1 − 2−α1−αc and
α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 < c <
α(1−α)
2−α .
Proposition 2.4 contrasts with the well-known belief that a centralized chan-
nel leads to higher consumer welfare than a decentralized channel. In the
parameter space defined in proposition 2.4, R is introduced in a centralized
channel but not in a decentralized channel. In the decentralized channel, the
retailer charges a low retail price and consumers do not evaluate due to the
high evaluation cost. In contrast, in the centralized channel, R is introduced
and consumers choose to evaluate the products in equilibrium. Consumers’
preference uncertainty is resolved and their surpluses are extracted. Con-




2.4.1 Quality Difference Between M and R
In previous studies, I have assumed that consumers gain a value of 1 after
purchasing a preferred brand, regardless of M or R. This assumption implies
that there is no quality difference between M and R such that consumers
get the same value from their preferred brands. I now relax this assumption
to incorporate quality differences in the model. So I assume that consumers
who prefer M will gain a value of 1 upon purchase, while consumers who
prefer R will get a value of γ (γ < 1). I focus on the most interesting case
where γ is not too small ( α
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ≤ γ < 1) to rule out the uninteresting
case that R will never be introduced.4
I identify the equilibrium product introduction strategy and pricing strate-
gies following the analysis similar to that in section 2.2. In equilibrium, the
manufacturer and retailer’s profits are functions of γ (see the appendix). By
observation, piR increases weakly with γ, indicating that the retailer benefits




piM also increases with γ (
∂piM
∂γ
= (1− α) > 0). This implies that the manu-
facturer can benefit when the quality of R increases.
Proposition 2.5 When α(1−α)γ
1+α
< c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 , the manufacturer brand
benefits from a retailer brand quality increase (∂piM
∂γ
= (1− α) > 0).
With the increase of γ, the retailer can charge higher retail prices if R is
introduced (αpM + (1 − α)pR = α + γ(1 − α) − c, which increases with γ),
since consumers are willing to pay more for R. Therefore, the retailer has a
greater incentive to introduce the retailer brand and induce consumer evalua-
tion. The manufacturer can then take advantage of the retailer’s incentive to
induce consumer evaluation and charge a higher wholesale price with the in-
crease of γ. Consequently, the manufacturer may benefit with higher retailer
brand quality.
4In addition, the fixed cost F and the consumer evaluation cost c are not too high
(F < γ(1− α) and c < (1 + γ)α(1− α)).
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2.4.2 Brand R Introduced by Manufacturer
In the main model, R is introduced by the retailer. In this subsection, I
study the case when R is introduced by the manufacturer instead of the re-
tailer in a decentralized channel. This allows us to see whether the benefit
of R for the manufacturer comes from greater consumer evaluation caused
by R itself or the retailer’s incentive to induce consumer evaluation. In the
model, the manufacturer decides whether to introduce R in addition to M
with a fixed cost F . All other setups are the same as in the main model. It is
straightforward to see that in equilibrium when the manufacturer introduces
R, the sole purpose is to induce consumer evaluation for the products, other-
wise it is strictly better for the manufacturer to distribute the more popular
brand M . In addition, the manufacturer should motivate the retailer to sell
both products. Assume that the manufacturer charges wholesale prices wM
and wR for M and R respectively. As shown in the appendix, wM and wR
should satisfy (2−α)c−(1−α)
(1−α)2 ≤ wM −wR ≤ α−(1+α)cα2 , wM ≤ 1 and wR ≤ 1 with
c ≤ α(1−α)
1+α−α2 to induce consumer evaluation. Hence, the optimal prices are
wM = 1 and wR =
α(1−α)+(1−α)c
α2
. I compare the manufacturer’s profit with
the case when R is introduced by the retailer in section 2.2, and summarize
the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6 In a decentralized channel, the manufacturer’s profit is
lower when R is introduced by the manufacturer itself instead of the retailer.
This happens when c ≤ α(1−α)
1+α−α2 and 2− 1α−α+ c(1−α
2)
α2




1+α−α2 < c <
α(1−α)




Interestingly, proposition 2.6 shows that the manufacturer benefits more
from R when R is introduced by the retailer instead of the manufacturer
itself. The intuition is as follows. When R is introduced by the manufacturer,
the retailer is less motivated to carry both M and R. Consequently, the
manufacturer has to lower its wholesale prices to motivate the retailer to
carry the whole product line and induce consumer evaluation. In contrast,
when R is introduced by the retailer, the retailer has a stronger incentive
to carry both M and R and induce consumer evaluation. Therefore, the
manufacturer is more likely to benefit from R when R is introduced by the
retailer, and the benefit of R to the manufacturer comes from the strategic
interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer rather than the greater
consumer evaluation caused by R.
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2.4.3 Higher Retailer Brand Popularity
Our main model assumes that the manufacturer brand is a more popular
brand (α > 1
2
). I now extend the model to study the case when the retailer
brand is more popular than the manufacturer brand (α < 1
2
). As shown
in the Appendix, when R becomes more popular, R is more likely to be
introduced in both a centralized and a decentralized channel. In addition,
now it is likely that only R is sold when R is sufficiently popular, which is in
contrast to the main model when M is more popular.
On one the hand, in a decentralized channel, I find that product introduc-
tion strategy is the same with section 2.2.1, where α > 1
2
. This indicates that
the retailer follows the same rule to introduce R when α < 1
2
. The retailer’s
selling strategy is different at high evaluation cost (c ≥ α), where it will in-
duce {ER} instead of {EM}. As a result, the retailer receives piR = 1−α−F ,
and the manufacturer receives piM = 0 (compared with piR = 1+α− c1−α −F
and piM =
c
1−α − 1). This is because the retailer is inclined to promote the
sales of R due to its high popularity (hence high demand) when consumer
evaluation is too costly to induce. And the manufacturer loses its stand to
induce the sales of the less popular manufacturer brand. On the other hand,
in a centralized channel, the firm follows a different retailer brand introduc-
tion strategy when α < 1
2
. The product introduction strategy is the same for
low evaluation cost (c < α). When c ≥ α, the firm introduces R if and only
F ≤ 1 − 2α (compared with F ≤ max{1 − c − α, 0}). Hence, when R be-
comes more popular than M , the firm alters the brand introduction strategy
to increase the likelihood of having a retailer brand in a centralized channel.
Also, with the presence of R, the firm will induce {ER} instead of {EM}
at a high cost of evaluation (c > c′), leading to channel profit pi = 1 − α
(compared to pi = α). In summary, when R becomes more popular than M ,
the product introduction strategy in a decentralized channel is unaffected,
while in a centralized channel, the firm is more likely to introduce R when
c ≥ α and F ≤ 1− 2α.
2.4.4 Cost to Evaluate Multiple Products
In this main model, I assume that the evaluation cost c does not depend on
the number of products in a product category. In this subsection, we examine
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the case where c is higher with more products in the product category. In
the model, when only M is in the market, consumer evaluation cost is still c.
However, when both M and R are in the market, consumer evaluation cost
becomes c+ k where k > 0. With the increase of the incremental evaluation
cost k, it is more difficult for the retailer to induce consumer evaluation. It
is straightforward to see this does not affect my main conclusions as long as
k is sufficiently low.
2.4.5 Revenue Sharing Contract
In the main model, we used a leader-follower model to capture the interac-
tions between manufacturer and retailer sequential pricing. Now I extend the
model to another type of manufacturer-retailer interaction of revenue shar-
ing. The revenue sharing model can be a Nash bargaining solution where
the more powerful party in the channel get hold of a larger proportion of
the channel profit. Assume that the manufacturer gets a δ proportion from
the profit of the manufacturer brand piM = δpMDM and the retailer gets
piR = (1 − δ)pMDM where DM is the demand for the manufacturer brand
at given pM and pR. The parameter δ measures the relative power of the
manufacturer over retailer and is fixed disregarding the retailer’s activity of
retailer brand introduction.
Based on this set up, in the subgame where a retailer brand is not intro-
duced, the manufacturer and the retailer gets:





R = (1− δ) c1−α if c ∈ (α(1−α)2−α , α(1− α)];
piEMM = δα, pi
EM
R = (1− δ)α otherwise.
(2.12)
In another subgame, where the retailer brand R has been introduced, the
retailer predominantly prefers to induce Ei and ER from consumers. To
induce Ei, the retailer charges p
Ei
M = α and p
Ei
R = 1 − α − c1−α . To induce
ER, the retailer charges p
ER
M =∞ and pERR = cα .
{
piEiM = δα









− F otherwise; (2.13)
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Unlike in the pricing leader-follower game, when the manufacturer and the
retailer employ the revenue sharing configuration, the manufacturer never
benefits from a retailer brand introduction. To see this, notice that with the
leader-follower interaction, the retailer receives piEiR = 1 − c − αw when Ei
is induced with a retailer brand introduction. The retailer accepts a high
wholesale price w from the manufacturer as long as w is not too high to
price M remove the extra benefits from inducing consumer evaluation. The
manufacturer’s profit is irrelevant of pM since the sales of M is fixed (piM =
αw). On the other hand, under the profit sharing configuration, piEiR = 1 −
c−αδpM , while leveraging the retailer prices to induce consumer evaluation,
the retailer lowers the price of the manufacturer’s brand as much as possible
so it may take advantage of the higher margin from the sales of a retailer
brand. In this case, the manufacturer’s profit is directly determined by pM
(piM = δαpM), and decreases as pM decreases. The revenue sharing contracts
manifest higher power to retailers in pricing, which leaves the manufacturer
with no opportunity to free ride on the retailer’s high incentive to induce
consumer evaluation.
2.5 Conclusion
In many product categories, it has become a growing trend for retailers to
introduce premium retailer brands which have unique features, designs and
styles, leading to a new manufacturer-retailer dynamic in retailing. Not
only can premium retailer brands impact manufacturer brands, they also
affect consumer decisions to evaluate products. With a retailer brand adding
product choices in store, consumers are more motivated to evaluate products
to resolve their preference uncertainties. My results provide guidelines for
retailers on adjusting the retailer brand introduction strategy to account
for consumer evaluation behavior. The findings also have implications for
manufacturers in terms of how they should react in response to retailer brand
introduction.
Our results suggest that a manufacturer can earn a higher profit when a
retailer introduces a retailer brand. The presence of a retailer brand promotes
the retailer’s incentive to induce consumer evaluation, and the manufacturer
can take advantage of this incentive and charge a higher wholesale price
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for the manufacturer brand. This finding is different from what is in the
extant literature, which claims that without other marketing externalities,
the manufacturer is always worse off with retailer brands. What is more,
the manufacturer may be better off when the retailer brand becomes more
popular. This is because the increasing retailer brand popularity further
promotes the retailer’s incentive to introduce a retailer brand, which again
benefits the manufacturer. Therefore, a manufacturer may not want to go
against the introduction of a retailer brand, especially in a product category
where the retailer brand complements the manufacturer brand and consumers
have to evaluate to find their preferred brands.
I show a retailer brand can be more likely to be introduced in either a
centralized or a decentralized channel depending on the difficulty for con-
sumers to evaluate the products. When product evaluation is relatively easy,
a retailer can charge higher retail prices to exploit consumer surpluses but is
subject to exploitation by the manufacturer. When evaluation is difficult, the
retailer can use a retailer brand to compete against the manufacturer brand.
Such issues do not appear in a centralized channel. Therefore, the retailer
brand is more likely to be introduced in a centralized channel when consumer
evaluation is easy, but less likely when consumer evaluation becomes more
difficult for consumers.
I also show that a retailer brand has important implications for consumer
welfare, and consumers may prove better off in a decentralized channel than
in a centralized one. This happens when the retailer brand is introduced
in a centralized channel but not in a decentralized channel. Although con-
sumers are more likely to find their preferred brands with more brands to
choose from, they suffer welfare losses due to the high retail prices. This
finding sends a warning message to public policy makers, alerting them to
the negative effects of centralized or coordinated channels.
This research highlights the important effects of premium retailer brands
on consumers and channel relationships. There are some limitations to the
current model. For instance, the product preference assumes either zero/one
utility for non-preferred/preferred product from consumers. Also, the model
assumes homogenous consumer evaluation cost while in reality, the evalua-
tion cost can be heterogenous across consumers. These limitations can be
addressed through relaxing the constraints, but my main findings are still
valid with the robustness checks. In the current paper, the popularities of
27
the retailer brand and the manufacturer brand are exogenous. For future re-
search, it is interesting to study the case when a retailer and a manufacturer
can invest in product popularity or quality to affect consumer evaluation.
In this model, I assumed a Stackelberg leadership between the manufacturer
and the retailer. Future research can examine the implications of different
game structures such as Vertical Nash. It will also be interesting to explore
the effects of premium retailer brands in a competitive channel structure
where consumers can evaluate products from competing manufacturers and
retailers. Furthermore, a retailer and a manufacturer may induce consumer
evaluation at different degrees which may resolve partial or complete prefer-
ence uncertainty for consumers.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BENEFITS OF A DECENTRALIZED
CHANNEL WITH VOLUNTARY QUALITY
DISCLOSURE
3.1 Introduction
Traditional literature on distribution channels unanimously suggests that in
the absence of retailer marketing skills, a vertically integrated channel rep-
resents a more efficient way of distribution compared with a decentralized
channel structure. That is, the vertically integrated profit is the maximum
aggregate profit that a vertical channel structure can obtain (Tirole, 1994).
This is because decentralized channels generate channel inefficiencies when
manufacturers and retailers price independently to optimize their individual
profits. However, this literature does not consider the effect of distribution
channel on overall channel efficiency when it is costly to observe and verify
some decision variables, which create information asymmetries among man-
ufacturers, retailers and consumers. In this paper, I consider the channel
efficiency in a centralized channel versus in a decentralized channel when the
product quality information is only privately known by the manufacturer, and
the manufacturer needs to incur a non-negligible cost to disclose its product
quality. The cost to disclose product quality information is a type of cost
to deliver product related information to consumers. Examples of marketing
activities that may incur such costs are advertising, product sampling and
acquiring third-party certification.1
I show that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the decentralized chan-
nel may outperform the centralized channel, and the aggregate channel profit
can be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. This
1A firm may need to pay for third parties to certify product quality due to credibility
issues, and this may incur an even higher cost. For instance, automotive manufacturers
have to pay high costs to have their new models certified for safety. Pharmaceutical
companies also need to spend a significant amount of money conducting clinical trials to
collect safety and efficacy data of a new drug even after the quality of the drug has been
tested.
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is because the channel structure and the product quality distribution affect
the manufacturer’s decisions on quality disclosure as well as consumer per-
ception of product quality. Consumers can infer product quality even when
the manufacturer does not disclose quality-related information. They are
aware of the means of distribution for the products, whether the products
are indirectly sold by a retailer or sold through an integrated channel. When
receiving little or no product quality information, consumers then make ra-
tional predictions of product quality based on channel structure as well as
product quality distribution. Since the manufacturer in a decentralized chan-
nel is subject to channel inefficiency caused by the double marginalization
problem, consumers perceive the given disclosure cost being less affordable to
the manufacturer if the product is distributed indirectly. Consumers then at-
tribute the non-disclosure behavior of the manufacturer to the decentralized
channel rather than to low product quality.
Consistent with consumers’ belief, the manufacturer chooses a credible dis-
closure strategy depending on the structure of the channel. Thanks to the
arising channel inefficiency, the manufacturer in a decentralized channel is
able to commit to a partial disclosure strategy revealing less product infor-
mation than in a centralized channel. This helps the manufacturer keep the
image of a decent product quality producer without incurring an expensive
disclosure cost. As a result, the overall channel can be better off when the
channel is decentralized.
A more efficient decentralized channel performance also relies on the prob-
ability distribution of product quality. While most literature assumes a uni-
form distribution of product quality (Board, 2009; Guo, 2009; Levin et al.,
2009), I show that this result does not arise unless the distribution is non-
uniform. In reality, some firms are better known as producing better quality
products than others. For instance, when General Mills, one of the world’s
leading food companies, launches its new yogurt line “FiberOne”, consumers
are likely to have faith in the high quality of the new product given the
company’s premium brand name and its long experience in the food indus-
try. Hence this assumption of a general product quality distribution better
captures the practice in most industries. Under the general distribution of
product quality, the decentralized channel profit can be higher than in the
centralized channel, both ex post and ex ante. Although the ex post decen-
tralized channel profit can be the maximum when the product quality is more
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likely to be high in distribution, the ex ante channel profit can be improved
only when there is sufficient likelihood for the manufacturer to obtain the ex
post benefits from channel decentralization, i.e., there is sufficient probability
for the manufacturer to withhold product information.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is related to the literature on channel coordination and channel
double marginalization. Extant literature investigates the external instru-
mentations to resolve the double marginalization issue and improve chan-
nel performance (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987; Jeuland and
Shugan, 1988; Lal, 1990; Ingene and Parry, 1995; Gerstner and Hess, 1995;
Iyer, 1998). The goal is to bring up the channel profit in a decentralized
channel close to the profit in a centralized channel by implementing different
pricing and non-pricing schemes. This implies that a centralized channel is
always a superior structure to achieve channel efficiency. However, in this
paper, I find that the centralized channel can be less efficient than a decen-
tralized one when there exists information uncertainty on product quality.
Without adopting any outside instrumentation, the decentralized channel
structure can indeed outperform the centralized one.
Notice the intuition of this research s different from the literature on strate-
gic channel decentralization (McGuire and Staelin, 1983; Moorthy, 1988;
Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989; Choi, 1991; Desai et al., 2004). For instance,
McGuire and Staelin (1983) find that strategic decentralization occurs when
there is intense product market competition. Moorthy (1988) further adds
that channel decentralization may be the equilibrium outcome, depending on
the substitutability and complementarity of products at retail and manufac-
turer level. This chapter provides a new mechanism under which a decentral-
ized channel can outperform a centralized channel even where competition is
absent.
This research is also related to the literature of voluntary quality dis-
closure. In this chapter, we mainly focus on verifiable quality information
disclosure as a form of quality assurance mechanism. We define quality dis-
closure as the most direct way to acknowledge the public of product quality
related information. Among numerous forms to convey product quality in-
31
formation, such as industry sponsored voluntary disclosure, private party
certification, warranties, money-back guarantee, prices, advertising expen-
diture and brand name, only the industry sponsored voluntary disclosure
conducted by the producer itself as well as the third-party quality certifi-
cation are deemed as quality disclosure by definition. Economics literature
predicts that sellers will always disclose their private information about the
quality of products as long as the disclosure cost is negligible (Grossman and
Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). The unraveling result may not
occur when the disclosure is costly (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1980;
Jovanovic, 1982; Guo, 2009; Dranove and Jin, 2010) and firms may adopt a
partial disclosure strategy to only disclose favorable product information. In
this paper, I study the effects of distribution channel structure instead of the
disclosure cost for a manufacturer’s disclosure strategy.
The notion of quality disclosure is also related to the broad class of quality
signaling literature. In signaling games, signals sent by senders do not have
to depend on the senders’ true type. Quality disclosure, however, is a special
type of signaling with verifiable information, where each type has a signal
that can only be sent by that specific type. In other words, the costs of
sending certain types of signal not pertaining to the sender’s true type are so
large that those signals can be ruled out, and lying becomes impossible. It is
shown that the verifiable information can be voluntarily revealed if the sender
and the receiver share the same ranking over the quality information, leading
to a full or partial revelation with dissipative disclosure cost (Grossman, 1981;
Seidmann and Winter, 1997).
Our study also sheds light on the level of advertising in distribution chan-
nels. Consistent with most theoretical and empirical findings (Michael, 1999;
Huang et al., 2002), I find the advertising level is lower in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized one. While studying the level of advertising
from the lens of product quality disclosure, I further suggest that when the
manufacturer is more likely to produce a high quality product, the manu-
facturer becomes even less likely to disclose quality information. What is
more, the difference of advertising level between a centralized channel and a
decentralized channel will increase as the quality distribution is more likely
to be on the high end.
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3.2 Model
Our model considers a manufacturer that sells its product through a retailer.
The product quality v distributes from zero to one following a cumulative
distribution function F (v). F (v) is a nondecreasing continuous function with
F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. The probability density function is f(v) = F ′(v),
which is a positive continuous function (f(v) > 0). When f(v) increases
with v (f ′(v) > 0), the product quality is more likely to be high, so the
manufacturer is known for producing high quality product; when f(v) de-
creases with v (f ′(v) < 0), the product quality is more likely to be low, so
the manufacturer is known for producing low quality product. This setup
captures the fact that some manufacturers are known for and are more expe-
rienced at producing high (low) quality products. I further assume that the
quality information is privately known by the manufacturer unless the manu-
facturer chooses to disclose the quality to the public by incurring a disclosure
cost c. This disclosure cost represents the cost of general technology such
as advertising, sampling, and third-party certificates, to deliver information
associated with product quality. I also assume that the manufacturer can
always credibly and truthfully disclose the private information of product
quality. Untruthful quality disclosure is unlikely due to legal restrictions or
public monitoring, and can be detrimental to the firm’s long-term welfare
(Grossman, 1981; Jovanovic, 1982).
Consumers have heterogenous tastes for product quality. Following Mussa
and Rosen (1978), I use an index θ to capture consumers’ heterogenous will-
ingness to pay for a unit of product quality, which follows the distribution
θ ∼ U [0, 1]. Therefore, consumers get a utility of u = θv−p from purchasing
the product. While the distribution of product quality F (v) is public infor-
mation, consumers do not know the true quality of the product unless it is
revealed by the manufacturer. I define the consumers’ belief about the prod-
uct quality by v˜. v˜ is equal to the true quality v if the quality information
is disclosed. Otherwise, consumers update their belief about the product
quality and v˜ is equal to the expected product quality v¯ conditioning on the
non-disclosure action by the manufacturer. At the purchase stage, consumers
make purchase decisions based on v˜.
I analyze a two-stage game. In the first stage, the manufacturer chooses to
disclose or withhold product information depending on the realized product
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quality v, and then charges a wholesale price w to the retailer. In the second
stage, the retailer sets the retailer price p. Consumers observe the product
quality v˜ as well as the retail price p and choose to purchase the product
if they derive a nonnegative utility from the product. I first study the case
of a centralized channel, where the manufacturer owns the retailer. Then I
compare the results with the case of a decentralized channel.
In the model setup, I assume the realized quality is independent from the
production cost, which is normalized to zero. This applies to the situation
where the manufacturer invests in R&D, but there is uncertainty associated
with the realized product quality. As a result, a higher investment in R&D
may only affect the quality distribution F (v) and increase the probability of
produce high quality products.
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Centralized Channel
In a centralized channel, the pricing decision is made to optimize the overall
channel profit. Consumers observe the manufacturer’s behavior as to dis-
closing its product quality and form a belief. I denote the cutoff quality to
disclose in the centralized channel by vˆc at which the manufacturer is indiffer-
ent between disclosing or not. If v > vˆc, the manufacturer chooses to disclose
the product information, whereas when v ≤ vˆc, the quality information is
not revealed. This partial disclosure strategy has been verified by Jovanovic
(1982). Consumers are aware of the optimal partial disclosure strategy, and
will update their belief about product quality, conditioning on the action of
disclosure by the manufacturer. The observed quality v˜c can be expressed by
v˜c =
{
v if disclose (v > vˆc);
E(v|v ≤ vˆc) = v¯c if no disclose (v ≤ vˆc),
(3.1)
where v¯c = E(v|v ≤ vˆc) = 1F (vˆc)
∫ vc
0
vf(v) dv = vˆc −
∫ vˆc
0
F (v)/F (vˆc) dv.
Given that consumers’ belief as to quality is v˜c, and the demand isD(p, v˜c) =
1− p
v˜c
, the manufacturer then optimizes its profit pic = pD(p, v˜c). At equilib-
rium, p∗ = v˜c/2, and the optimized channel profit gross the cost of disclosure
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is pic = v˜c
4
.
In the first stage, the manufacturer discloses or withholds product informa-
tion according to a partial disclosure strategy. A credible disclosure strategy
depends on the cost of disclosure as well as the channel profit, and must
ensure that the manufacturer has no incentive to deviate. By adopting the




silent, v˜ = v¯c, and pi
c = v¯c
4
. Since the manufacturer is indifferent between
disclosure or not at v = vˆc, it follows that pi
c(v = vˆc)− c = pic(v = v¯c), and I
have vˆc
4
− c = v¯c
4
. Therefore, the disclosure cutoff point vˆc must satisfy:∫ vˆc
0
F (v) dv = 4F (vˆc)c. (3.2)
Notice that to guarantee a unique solution of vˆc from equation (3.2), it is
required that G(v) =
∫ v
0 F (x) dx
F (v)
be a monotonically increasing function of v
(dG(v)/dv > 0) (see proof in the appendix). Otherwise the manufacturer is
unable to commit to a unique disclosure strategy. This implies that when
consumers are forming expectations of product quality, the expected quality
conditioning on no disclosure behavior does not increase as fast as the realized
quality (G(v) = v − v¯ and increases with v).
The ex ante profit that the manufacturer expects to gain prior to the real-


















f(v) dv − c ∫ vˆc
0


















where K = 1− ∫ 1
0
F (v) dv, which is the average quality of the product. The
manufacturer adopts a partial disclosure strategy (vˆc < 1) when c <
1−K
4
with vˆc defined by equation (3.2). When c ≥ 1−K4 , the manufacturer adopts
a complete non-disclosure strategy (vˆc = 1).
3.3.2 Decentralized Channel
Now I consider the case of a decentralized channel where the manufacturer
and the retailer make decisions independently. The manufacturer first de-
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cides whether to disclose product quality and charges a wholesale price w.
The retailer then decides on the retail price p. I denote consumers’ belief
as to product quality in a decentralized channel by v˜d. The demand in a
decentralized channel becomes D(v˜d, p) = 1 − pv˜d . The retailer optimizes its
profit pir = (p − w)(1 − pv˜d ), which generates p∗ = v˜+w2 . The manufacturer
optimizes pim = wv˜. It follows that w
∗ = v˜/2, and depending on the cost








Similar to the analysis in section 3.3.1, the manufacturer adopts a par-
tial disclosure strategy with cutoff quality vˆd at which the manufacturer
is indifferent between disclosure or not. Therefore, v˜d = v if v > vˆd and
v˜d = v¯d = vˆd −
∫ vˆd
0
F (v)/F (vˆd) dv if v ≤ vˆd. The equilibrium vˆd is identified
by equating the manufacturer’s profits pidm with and without disclosure at
v = vˆd. This requires that pi
d
m(v = vˆd) − c = pidm(v = v¯d) and vd8 − c = v¯d8 .
Hence the optimal disclosure cutoff point (vˆd) should satisfy:∫ vˆd
0
F (v) dv = 8cF (vˆd). (3.4)




F (x) dx/F (v). Since G(v) increases monotonically with
v, and with 8c > 4c, the manufacturer in a decentralized channel is less
likely to disclose its product quality information than in a centralized channel
(vˆc < vˆd). This tendency can be attributed to the fact that the manufacturer
needs to share the channel profit with a retailer and is subjected to the
double marginalization effect in a decentralized channel. As a result of that,
the manufacturer is less likely to afford the cost of disclosure unless the
product quality is high enough to entail a disclosure. This adjustment of
disclosure strategy with channel structure may have two impacts: firstly, it
helps the manufacturer save the cost to disclose when the quality information
is unfavorable; secondly, it may impede the efficiency of transaction since less
information is revealed. I later show in section 3.3.3 that the positive effect
may dominate, and the channel efficiency may be improved in a decentralized
channel.















F (v) dv−c. The ex ante retailer’s
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(a) Quality more likely to be high,
f ' HvL < 0
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(b) Quality more likely to be low
Figure 3.1: An illustration of quality distribution with f ′(v) > 0 and f ′(v), 0
expected overall channel profit E(pid) = E(pidm)+E(pi
d



















Similar to the case in the centralized channel, this channel profit is contin-
gent on partial disclosure strategy when c < 1−K
8
, where K = 1−∫ 1
0
F (v) dv.
When c ≥ 1−K
8
, the manufacturer adopts a complete non-disclosure strategy.
3.3.3 The Effects of Channel Structure
Effect on Disclosing Strategy
I compare the optimal channel disclosure strategy in a centralized chan-
nel and a decentralized channel and summarize the results in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (a)When the product quality is more likely to be low (f ′(v) < 0),
the manufacturer chooses a lower cutoff disclosure quality (vˆd and vˆc both
decrease) in both a centralized and a decentralized channel. The difference
between the two disclosure strategies (vˆd − vˆc) decreases.
(b)When the product quality is more likely to be high (f ′(v) > 0), the man-
ufacturer chooses a higher cutoff disclosure quality (vˆd and vˆc both increase)
in both a centralized and a decentralized channel. The difference between the
two disclosure strategies (vˆd − vˆc) increases.
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Lemma 3.1 describes the trend with which vˆd and vˆc change with the qual-
ity distribution F (v). Figure 3.1 illustrates the shape of f(v) with different
types of quality distribution. When f ′(v) < 0, the probability decreases as
v increases, indicating that the product quality is more likely to be at the
low end side. When f ′(v) > 0, the probability increases with v, and there is
an increasing probability for the product quality to be at the high end side.
Interestingly, when the product quality is likely to be low (f ′(v) < 0), the
manufacturer is more likely to adopt a lower vˆc(vˆd) and disclose more prod-
uct information at equilibrium. This is in contrast with the literature which
claims that high-quality firms would always gain from revealing the true
quality of their products in order to distinguish themselves from low-quality
firms and charge higher prices, and only those with the lowest quality would
choose not to reveal the quality of their products (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom,
1981). My results show that a high quality firm (a firm which is more likely
to produce high quality product) will disclose less product information than
a low quality firm (a firm which is more likely to produce lower quality prod-
uct) in equilibrium. This is because consumer perception of product quality
varies with F (v). When f ′(v) > 0, consumers expect product quality to be
decently high even when no information is revealed. Then the manufacturer
has higher incentive to withhold information by choosing a higher vˆ and save
the cost to disclose. When f ′(v) > 0, consumers, who know about the qual-
ity distribution, will significantly downgrade the product quality when they
observe no information is disclosed. In reaction, the manufacturer chooses
to compensate for that by revealing the product information even with lower
product quality (by choosing a lower cutoff disclosure quality vˆ).
Effect on Channel Profit
Now I compare the overall channel profits in the centralized and the decen-
tralized channel. The channel profit difference is given by ∆pi = pic − pid. I
first discuss the ex post channel profit difference when the quality of the prod-
uct has been realized, and then examine the ex ante profit difference, which
measures the channel performance in general. The ex post profit difference





where v˜c and v˜d are the observed product quality by consumers in the cen-
tralized and decentralized channel respectively. According to the definition
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of v˜c and v˜d, and with c < (1−K)/8, I have









(vˆd − 8c) if vˆc < v ≤ vˆd;
1
4
vˆc − 316 vˆd + c2 if v ≤ vˆc.
(3.6)
I compare the ex post channel profits in the centralized and the decentralized
channel, and summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 The ex post channel profit is higher in a decentralized
channel than in a centralized one (∆pi = pic − pid < 0) when the realized
product quality is low (v < 3
4
vˆd − 2c) and when the disclosure cutoff points
are sufficiently different in the centralized and the decentralized channel (3vˆd−
4vˆc > 8c).
Proposition 3.1 shows that interestingly, the ex post channel profit can
be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. This is
because the channel structure affects consumer perception of product qual-
ity. In a decentralized channel, consumers perceive that the manufacturer’s
profit is impacted by the negative effect of channel double marginalization,
and the cost to disclose becomes less affordable to the manufacturer. Con-
sumers will then attribute the non-disclosure behavior of the manufacturer to
the inefficiency arising from channel decentralization instead of low product
quality. But this effect is absent in a centralized channel. Therefore, when
the manufacturer does not disclose product quality information in both dis-
tribution channel structures due to the low realized product quality (v ≤ vˆc),
consumers believe that the expected product quality in a decentralized chan-
nel is always higher than in a centralized channel (v¯d > v¯c). Under this
condition, the decentralized channel will outperform the centralized channel
(pic−pid < 0) as long as 3vˆd−4vˆc > 8c. In addition, when the realized product
quality is moderately high (vˆc < v ≤ vˆd), the manufacturer can keep silent in
a decentralized channel, but has to disclose product quality in a centralized
channel due to different consumer perceptions caused by channel structure
differences. The manufacturer in the decentralized channel can save the cost
to reveal quality information while still maintaining consumers’ expectation
of decent quality even when no information is revealed, which improves the
overall channel profit when v < 3
4
vˆd − 2c. When vˆd < v ≤ 1, the realized
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quality v is high enough such that the manufacturer discloses the quality
information in both channels. In this case, the decentralized channel profit is
always lower than the centralized channel, due to the double marginalization
effect.
Moreover, the product quality distribution further moderates consumer
perceptions of product quality under different channel structures. For in-
stance, when the manufacturer’s product quality is more likely to be high
(f ′(v) > 0), consumers perceive that the manufacturer distributing the high
quality product in a decentralized channel suffers even more from the dou-
ble marginalization effect. Hence when consumers observe the manufacturer
withholding product quality information, their perceived quality increases if
the product quality is more likely to be high (f ′(v) > 0). When the product
quality is more likely to be low (f ′(v) < 0), the effect of double marginal-
ization is less severe, and consumers attribute the non-disclosure of product
information by the manufacturer more to the low product quality rather
than the double marginalization caused by the decentralized channel. Con-
sequently, the manufacturer’s optimal disclosing strategy is affected by the
product quality distribution function F (v), and the difference between the
disclosure cutoff points (vˆd− vˆc) is higher when f ′(v) > 0, and smaller when
f ′(v) < 0.
I now consider the ex ante profit difference between a centralized channel
and a decentralized channel when the product quality has not been realized.
While the ex post profit difference only describes possible realized quality
with which a decentralized channel may achieve a higher channel profit, the
overall performance of a centralized channel compared to a decentralized
channel can be evaluated by the ex ante channel profit difference, which
is defined by the weighted sum of ex post profit differences. The ex ante
profit difference (E(pic) − E(pid)) can be obtained by comparing the profits





− (F (vˆd)− F (vˆc))c if c < 1−K8 ;
K
16





Proposition 3.2 The ex ante channel profit can be higher in a decentral-
ized channel than in a centralized channel if F (v) satisfies
∫ vˆd
vˆc




F (v) dv + K
2
, where c < 1−K
8
and vˆd and vˆc are defined by equations
(3.2) and (3.4).
Proposition 3.2 shows that the ex ante channel profit may also be higher in
a decentralized channel than in a centralized one. Since the ex ante profit
is the weighted sum of the ex post profits, the rationale behind proposi-
tion 3.2 is similar to that for proposition 3.1, where consumers attribute the
non-disclosing behavior of the manufacturer to the double marginalization
problem in the decentralized channel rather than to low product quality. On
the one hand, a necessary condition for this to occur is the ex post chan-
nel profit in a decentralized channel being higher than in the centralized one,
which requires that the realized product quality is low (v < 3
4
vˆd−2c), and the
disclosure strategies being sufficiently different (3vˆd−4vˆc > 8c), as described
in proposition 3.1. Based on Lemma 3.1, the ex post benefit for a decentral-
ized channel can be higher when the quality is more likely to be distributed
on the high end side (f ′(v) > 0). On the other hand, the ex post decentral-
ized benefit is realized when the product quality is low, which requires that
the product quality has sufficient distribution at the low end side so that the
manufacturer can glean the benefits from the higher ex post profit. Hence,
when the product quality is more likely to be low f ′(v) < 0, the manufacturer
has higher probability of realizing the ex post benefit from a decentralized
channel and suffers less from the negative effect of channel decentralization.
The distribution function F (v) that is likely to generate higher ex ante chan-
nel profit in a decentralized channel, as described in proposition 3.2, should
compromise the ex post channel profit (quality distribution more likely to be
high) with the probability of realizing the benefit (quality distribution more
likely to be low).
3.3.4 Power Distribution of Quality
In the previous sections, I used the general function F (v) to derive equilib-
rium outcomes. Now I assume the quality follows an power distribution func-
tion F (v) = vt and f(v) = tvt−1, where t > 0, to illustrate the model solu-
tions and implications. According to equations (3.2) and (3.4), vˆc = 4(t+1)c,
vˆd = 8(t + 1)c and K = 1 − 1t+1 . The ex ante profit difference between a
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centralized and a decentralized channel defined by (3.7) becomes:
E(pic)− E(pid) = t
16(t+ 1)
+ (4(t+ 1))t(1− 2t)ct+1, (3.8)
where c ≤ (1 − K)/8 = 1
8(t+1)
. I have E(pic) − E(pid) < 0 when t < 1 and
c1 < c ≤ 18(t+1) , where c1 = 14(t+1)( t4(2t−1))
1
t+1 . This is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 When the quality follows an power distribution F (v) = vt
(t > 0), the ex ante channel profit is higher in a decentralized channel than
in a centralized channel (E(pic)−E(pid) < 0) when t < 1 and c1 < c ≤ 18(t+1) .
Proposition 3.3 indicates that with the power quality distribution (F (v) =
vt), the decentralized channel may outperform the centralized channel if the
product quality is more likely to be low (t < 1 and f ′(v) = t(t− 1)vt−2 < 0).
In this case, when the manufacturer does not disclose the product quality in
a decentralized channel, consumers may attribute it to the double marginal-
ization problem rather than to low quality and expect the product quality to
be high. Therefore, the benefit from withholding unfavorable information in
a decentralized channel outweighs the loss from double marginalization, lead-
ing to a higher channel profit in a decentralized channel. When the product
quality is more likely to be high (t > 1 and f ′(v) = t(t − 1)vt−2 > 0), con-
sumers perceive the quality of the product being even higher in a decentral-
ized channel than in a centralized one without product quality information
(v¯d− v¯c = 8tc and increases with t), and the ex post profit in a decentralized
channel is higher when the realized product quality is low (v < (6t + 4)c).
However, the probability for the ex post decentralized channel profit to be
higher is small, and the decentralized channel also suffers more from chan-
nel double marginalization. Overall, the ex ante channel profit is lower in a
decentralized channel than in a centralized channel when t > 1.
Notice that the decentralized channel has the highest potential to out-
perform the centralized channel (E(pic) − E(pid) is lowest) when t = 0.39.
When t approaches 0, consumers infer the quality to be very low in either
a decentralized or a centralized channel without product information from
the manufacturer. They also infer the expected qualities in the two chan-
nels to be similar (v¯d = 8tc and v¯c = 4tc become more nearly the same as t
approaches 0). As a result, consumers do not prefer the product in a decen-
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Figure 3.2: Quality distribution F (v) = vt at different levels of t
(t = 2, 1, 1/2).
tralized channel much more than the product in a centralized channel when
information is withheld by the manufacturer in either channel structure. In
fact, when t approaches zero, 3vˆd − 4vˆc = 8(t + 1)c ' 8c, indicating the ex
post benefit from a decentralized channel is eliminated as t approaches zero.
With some dispersion of quality at the low quality side (t ∼ 0.39), consumers
perceive the product quality in the decentralized channel being sufficiently
different from the quality in the centralized channel. While double marginal-
ization does not seriously impact the decentralized channel profit, the higher
perceived product quality in a decentralized channel contributes to a higher
ex ante decentralized channel profit. In essence, for F (v) = vt, hiding infor-
mation is most beneficial for the decentralized channel when the quality is
likely to be low but still with some degree of dispersion.
General quality distribution function
I now illustrate proposition 3.3 by examining the distribution function
F (v) = vt with t = 1, 1/2 and 2 respectively. The results are discussed as
follows and are also plotted in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
(1) Uniform quality distribution
Assume that the quality is uniformly distributed from zero to one. This
is the setting adopted by most literature (Board, 2009; Guo, 2009; Levin
et al., 2009). Then F (v) = v and f(v) = 1. The cutoff quality vˆc = 8c
and vˆd = 16c, with K = 1 −
∫ 1
0
F (v) dv = 1
2
. The channel profit difference
E(pic) − E(pid) = 1
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+ (vˆc − vˆd)c = 132 − 8c2, where c ≤ (1 −K)/8 = 1/16.









Figure 3.3: Change of channel profit (E(pic)− E(pid)) with respect to the
disclosure cost c. (F (v) = vt, t = 2, 1, 1/2)
when the quality of the product is uniformly distributed, the decentralized
channel will never outperform the centralized one.
(2) Quality concentrated on the low end side
When t = 1/2, I have F (v) =
√




. The cutoff qualities are




v dv = 1
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6c−√12v)c where c ≤ 1
12
. It can then be proved that E(pic)−E(pid) > 0
when c < c∗ < 1
12




2)1/3; and E(pic) − E(pid) ≤ 0 when
c∗ ≤ c ≤ 1
12
. This is consistent with proposition 3.3, which states that the
decentralized channel may outperform the centralized one when the power
distribution form satisfies t < 1.
(3) Quality concentrated on the high end side
When t = 2, I have F (v) = v2 and f(v) = 2v. The cutoff qualities are
vˆc = 12c and vˆd = 24c, with K = 1 −
∫ 1
0
v2 dv = 2
3
. Then E(pic) − E(pid) =
1
24
+ ((12c)2 − (24c)2)c = 1
24
− 432c3 where c ≤ 1
24
. For this type of quality
distribution, the decentralized channel profit is always lower.
3.4 Conclusion
Does a centralized channel always outperform a decentralized channel, as
suggested by most marketing literature on distribution channels? The an-
swer is no. In this paper, I show that a decentralized channel may out-
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perform a centralized channel in achieving higher ex post or ex ante overall
channel profits disregarding the inefficiency brought about by the double
marginalization problem. This happens when a manufacturer has private
information on its product quality, and consumers have to infer the prod-
uct quality from the manufacturer’s behavior as to disclosing the product
quality in both a centralized and a decentralized channel. When a manufac-
turer’s product quality is low and the manufacturer chooses not to disclose
the product quality information in a decentralized channel, consumers may
attribute information-withholding behavior of the manufacturer to the dou-
ble marginalization problem rather than the low product quality. Therefore,
the manufacturer can then keep the image of producing higher product qual-
ity, which leads to a higher channel profit in a decentralized channel than in
a centralized channel. This finding has important implications for marketing
managers when they choose their channel structures, especially in industries
where manufacturers often have private information on the quality of their
products.
The beneficial channel decentralization and the degree of channel profit
improvement are also contingent on the public information of quality distri-
bution. When the product quality is more likely to be high, a manufacturer
that is characterized as a high-quality manufacturer may commit to the strat-
egy of disclosing less product information in a decentralized channel. This
may benefit the channel by improving consumer perception of the product
quality and saving the cost to disclose unfavorable product quality informa-
tion. Hence I show that the decentralized channel may gain higher ex post
and ex ante benefits when the quality distribution is more concentrated on
the high quality side but when the realized product quality turns out to
be low. This finding also has profound implications for manufacturers on
improving their images of producing higher product quality.
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CHAPTER 4
CHANNEL QUALITY DISCLOSURE WITH
RETAILER BRAND INTRODUCTION
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3, I show that a manufacturer may adopt a partial disclosure
strategy to reveal the information of its product. I also show that a channel
double marginalization affects the manufacturer’s profit, leading to a reduced
incentive for the upstream manufacturer to reveal its product information. In
that model setting, the retailer is purely the distributor of the manufacturer
brand and passively observes the manufacturer’s product quality only when
it has been disclosed. In this chapter, I examine the effect of a store brand
introduction and how it influences the manufacturer’s incentive to disclose
the private information of product quality.
The introduction of store brands/retailer brands has become a common
practice in the retailing industry. Retailer brands are brands which are
owned and managed by the store retailers, and are introduced to attract
more value conscious consumers. For instance, almost all pharmacy stores
such as Walgreen, CVS have introduced store branded medicine; chain stores
like Target, Walmart and Aldi are filling their shelves with store brands in
categories such as prepared food, skincare and personal care. Even online
retailers such as Amazon.com are selling house brand electronics, kitchen
tools and outdoor furniture. The presence of retailer brands naturally en-
riches consumers’ purchase option and also creates competition against na-
tional brands/manufacturer brands. In response to the retailer brands entry,
manufacturers may take drastic measures (such as reducing the price, in-
store/out-store promotion) to engage in head-to-head competition or to shirk
by targeting the product to less competitive market segments. However, few
literature has specifically addressed the change of manufacturer’s incentive
to disclose product quality information in presence of retailer brands.
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Quality disclosure is a type of informative advertising to communicate
product quality information with potential buyers. Commodity producers
usually have better information of their own product qualities than others
as they routinely invest to acquire accurate product information. The infor-
mation is privately known by producers or brand owners and can be known
to the public if producers choose to voluntarily disclose the information or
if quality disclosure is mandated by law (Jovanovic, 1982; Matthews and
Postlewaite, 1985; Gavazza and Lizzeri, 2007). Although buyers can refer
to online forum or consumer report for better understanding of the product,
compared with manufacturers, they do not possess the necessary resources
to invest and acquire more precise quality information. Even in the B-to-B
context, contracting firms do not have accurate information regarding other
firms’ product quality. For instance, the upstream manufacturer in a distri-
bution channel have private information of its product quality which is not
necessarily known by the downstream retailer, as the manufacturer has more
expertise in production and testing. If sellers decide to reveal their product
quality, the quality information can be credibly disclosed to the public at a
cost. There are many forms of credible and truthful quality disclosure. For
instance, manufacturer can rely on independent third-party certification or
distribute testing products to deliver verifiable product information. Hotels
can enroll in star rating classification system to reveal the service qualities,
consumer packaged goods manufacturers can send out try-out samples to
potential buyers.
The focus of this chapter is to study the quality information disclosure for
a manufacturer and a retailer in a channel with the retailer introducing a
retailer brand in addition to the manufacturer brand. I want to address re-
search three questions. First, in the context of a retailer brand introduction,
what are the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s decision to disclose product
quality information? Second, how do asymmetries between manufacturer and
retailer impact the information disclosure strategy? Third, what is whole-
sale pricing by the manufacturer and its implication to distribution channel
efficiency?
Past literature on voluntary quality disclosure have examined sellers’ incen-
tive to reveal product quality for monopolist and duopolists. In a monopoly
setting, sellers adopt partial disclosure strategy when it is costly to disclose
product information (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Jovanovic, 1982). In a
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duopoly setting, firms engaged in competition reveal less quality information
(Board, 2009; Guo and Zhao, 2009). Nevertheless, if firms disclose informa-
tion in a sequential fashion compared to a simultaneous disclosure, the leader
will be even less likely to disclose (Guo and Zhao, 2009). In this chapter,
I investigate a manufacturer’s incentive to conduct quality disclosure when
the downstream retailer introduces a store brand. While channel inefficien-
cies dampens the manufacturer’s incentive to reveal product information (see
chapter 3), I are interested in whether the addition of a retailer brand reduces
or promotes such incentive. I are also interested in the retailer brand quality
disclosure conducted by the retailer, which is not studied previously.
I also model the asymmetries between the manufacturer and the retailer
to account for the impact from disclosure costs and quality distribution dif-
ferences. Guo and Zhao (2009)study a model with symmetric duopoly. How-
ever, in reality firms may incur different costs to disclose product qualities.
For instance, manufacturers usually convey product information through tra-
ditional media such as television advertising and newspaper, which may incur
higher disclosure cost; retailers can use more direct disclosure through on-
site testing, sampling or in-store education to achieve more cost efficient
quality unraveling. Since the manufacturer will take the retailer’s quality
disclosure strategy into account when making decisions, a change of the re-
tailer’s disclosure cost might impact the manufacturer’s incentive to disclose
as well. The chapter also analyzes different quality distributions between
the manufacturer and the retailer brand with retailer brand possessing a
lower product quality on average. This configuration is consistent with the
common notion that a retailer brand being a low quality substitute to the
manufacturer brand. I then analyze the condition under which manufacturer
quality disclosure becomes more sensitive to the change retailer brand quality
distribution.
This study also sheds light on the efficiency of manufacturer brand dis-
tribution in distribution channels. A retailer can mitigate channel double
marginalization in distributing the manufacturer brand by providing a lower
quality product (Mills, 1995; Yehezkel, 2008). This is because the down-
stream competition motivates the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price
which translates to lowered retail price and improved channel efficiency. The
similar mechanism may apply in the context of this model, but it is unclear
whether the change of the manufacturer’s quality disclosure will cause the
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manufacturer charge a lower wholesale price and what is the implication to
channel performance.
To answer the proposed research questions, I examine a model of a monop-
olist manufacturer and a retailer who distribute a manufacturer brand and
a retailer brand respectively to heterogenous consumers in a decentralized
distribution channel. The retailer brand is only vertically differentiated from
the manufacturer brand, and quality information is privately known by prod-
uct owners (the manufacturer and the retailer). The manufacturer and the
retailer voluntarily reveal the product information sequentially at different
costs. Following the basic model by Jovanovic (1982), I study the manu-
facturer and the retailer equilibrium strategy to disclose/withhold product
information.
In general, I find that manufacturer reveals less product information when
a retailer brand is introduced. The cannibalization effect from a retailer
brand undermines the manufacturer expected payoff from selling the man-
ufacturer brand, and makes it more costly to disclose. Suffering from the
inability to extract more surpluses through information disclosure, the man-
ufacturer has less desire to conduct information disclosure. The retailer can
be more(less) likely to disclose when the cost to disclose is low (high) com-
pared with the manufacturer. Interestingly, unlike demonstrated by Guo and
Zhao (2009), the retailer’s equilibrium disclosure strategy does not always de-
pend on the observed quality from the manufacturer, although the retailer
is able to strategically adjust the disclosure behavior. This happens when
the observed manufacture brand quality is very low or high. The vertical
relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer entails both competition
and collaboration. On one hand, the retailer brand cannibalizes sales for
the manufacturer brand, creating downstream competition. On the other
hand, the dynamics can not be completely explained by a simple head-to-
head competition between duopoly firms. When the manufacturer brand
quality is very low or high, the retailer strategically leverages the final retail
prices for the two brands to account for the relative quality levels instead of
focusing on undercutting the other brand. Consistent with this notion, the
retailer unambiguously has higher incentive to disclose product information
when disclosure costs are the same across the manufacturer and the retailer.
This is in contrast to the result discussed by Guo and Zhao (2009) who show
that the retailer has less incentive to disclose when the cost to disclose is low.
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The manufacturer’s incentive to disclose also depends on the disclosure
costs incurred by the manufacturer and the retailer respectively. Manufac-
turer is less likely to disclose as the cost increases. Interestingly, I show that
the manufacturer’s incentive to disclose first weakly decreases then increases
with the retailer’s disclosure cost. This occurs since the retailer’s disclosure
costs partial defines the competitiveness of the retailer brand and in turn
affects the manufacturer’s strategy. I also find the manufacturer is less will-
ing to disclose when the average quality from the retailer brand increases,
and the disclosure strategy becomes most sensitive to the retailer quality
distribution with moderate low disclosure cost.
Finally, I demonstrate that the ex post wholesale price charged by the man-
ufacturer can be higher than the price charged in absence of a retailer brand.
However, the competition of a retailer brand lowers the ex ante expected
wholesale price, leading to a improved retailer performance in distributing
the manufacturer brand at the expense of the manufacturer.
4.1.1 Literature
Information disclosure is one way to resolve market inefficiencies caused by
asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970). Sellers may apply numerous “qual-
ity assurance” mechanism such as industry-sponsored voluntary quality dis-
closure, private third-party certifiers, warranties and branding to establish
verifiable quality information (Dranove and Jin, 2010). Quality disclosure
is a direct way to deliver quality information, which includes the system-
atic report from certification agency and the direct information provided by
sellers, provided that the information is verifiable. The rationale that un-
derlies quality disclosure is for a high quality seller to distinguish itself from
other competitors. A large body of literature has devoted to examine firms
incentives to conduct voluntary quality disclosure to less informed buyers.
The product quality disclosure theory discusses the unraveling results where
the best quality firm has higher incentive to disclose. In case of zero dis-
closure cost, sellers will always disclose since rational consumers may infer
lowest qualities from sellers which do not disclose (Grossman, 1981; Mil-
grom, 1981). This result depend on some strong assumptions such as the
monopoly market structure, costless revelation and homogenous consumer.
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Other quality disclosure strategy may emerge some of the aforementioned as-
sumptions are relaxed. If there is a positive cost associated with information
disclosure then sellers may credibly engage in partial information disclosure
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jovanovic, 1982). With partial disclosure, more
favorable product information is revealed while less favorable information
will be credibly withheld by the seller. The change of market structure also
play a role. Board (2009) demonstrates that competitive duopoly tends to
hide more product information to avoid intensified competition even if the
cost to disclose is negligible. This is further shown by Guo and Zhao (2009)
who studied the simultaneous and sequential information disclosure between
duopoly with positive disclosure cost. The competition yields less incentive
to disclose for both firms, because the competitive pressure restricts their
abilities to extract extra surplus from buyers through information disclo-
sure. Moreover, the disclosure leader always discloses less information while
the follower discloses less or more depending on the disclosure cost. Other
studies also show that when products differ in both vertical and horizontal
dimensions and with heterogenous consumers duopoly sellers tend to hide
quality information to avoid intensified competition.
The research is also related to the literature which examines firms’ action
to signal private information of product quality. Firms with cost advan-
tage may signal product quality or low cost through low pricing (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986; Bagwell and Ramey, 1988), nevertheless, high quality
firms which incur higher production cost may signal quality by distorting
the price upward (Wolinsky, 1983; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). There are
other ways to deliver quality signal, including product warranty (Gal-Or,
1989; Balachander, 2001), money back guarantee (Moorthy and Srinivasan,
1995), planned scarcity (Stock2005) and advertising (Milgrom and Roberts,
1986; Zhao, 2000; Daughety and Reinganum, 2008). This research is related
to signaling product quality through advertising. It is established that adver-
tising spending can signal quality when it is too costly for the low quality firm
to mimic the high quality one (Nelson, 1974; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).
In this case, advertising is purely dissipative expense and the content of ad-
vertising does not matter. When advertising raises awareness, high quality
firm may spend less on advertising to signal quality (Zhao, 2000). Daughety
and Reinganum (2008) consider a unified model of quality disclosure and
signaling as two forms of communication which complement each other when
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quality is exogenous. Firms may use advertising to directly disclose prod-
uct quality to inform fractions of consumers (Moraga-Gonzalez, 2000), and
price signal can substitute information disclosure. My research differs from
the past advertising and signaling literature in the following ways: firstly,
the adverting spending is exogenously determined by technology, sellers are
subject to different costs to conduct quality disclosure; secondly, disclosure
informs all consumers, there is no need to use price signals as complements
or substitutes.
Lastly, there are studies on channel advertising and promotional activ-
ity associated with a store brands introduction. When a manufacturer dis-
tributes a product through retailers, it conduct less of advertising activ-
ity due to channel conflicts(Michael, 1999; Huang et al., 2002; Shaffer and
Zettelmeyer, 2004). The introduction of store brands general introduce com-
petition against national brands. As a result the store retailer receives higher
retail margin and establish market power (Pauwels and Srinivasan, 2004;
Ailawadi and Harlam, 2004). Empirical literature focuses on the promo-
tional price competition between store brands and national brands. As a
result of the competing promotional activities, competing promotional ac-
tivities, the national brands to adopt the Hi/Lo pricing promotion while the
store brands stick to the EDLP (everyday low price) (Dhar and Hoch, 1997;
Ailawadi et al., 2001). Advertising costs and advertising intensity also af-
fects the margin drawn by manufacturers and retailers, while retailers earn
a higher margin from the national brand with a strong store brand presence,
the manufacturer may command higher wholesale from the retailer through
heavy advertising (Ailawadi and Harlam, 2004). Since the advertising costs
is positively related to the advertising level, Abe (1995) suggests that na-
tional brand owner may choose a higher advertising level than store brands,
to signal superior quality. Contrary to the previous literature, this paper in-
vestigates the act of manufacturer and retailer quality advertising as a form
of informative advertising rather than price promotion or uninformative ad-
vertising to simply signal product quality.
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4.1.2 Model
Consider in a distribution channel where a monopolist manufacturer sells a
manufacturer brand (M) through a single retailer. The retailer also intro-
duces a retailer brand (R). The product quality of the manufacturer brand
(vm) and the retailer brand (vr) are uniformly distributed between zero and
one (U [0, 1]). The quality information is privately known by each of the
brand owner unless it choose to disclose the quality to the public. I also
assume that both manufacturer and retailer can credibly reveal the private
information on product quality.
Consumers have heterogenous tastes for product quality. Following Mussa
and Rosen (1978), the parameter θ is used to capture consumer’s heteroge-
nous willingness to pay for a unit of product quality, which follows a uniform
distribution θ ∼ U [0, 1]. Buyers who purchased from any of the brands
receive a surplus of θvi − pi, i = m, r. Since the quality of each brand is pri-
vately known by the manufacturer and the retailer respectively, it may not be
observed by the public unless the information has been disclosed. The man-
ufacturer and the retailer incur a fixed disclosure cost cm and cr to conduct
information revelation. cm and cr represent the costs of general marketing
devices, such as advertising, requesting the third-party certification or pro-
viding samples, to disseminate information associated with product quality.
To simplify the analysis, I assume the costs are small enough (cm, cr ≤ 3/32).
I use di(i = m, r) to denote the action of quality disclosure. di = 1 indicates
that quality is disclosed, and di = 0 indicates that no information is revealed
by i. Assume that consumers’ beliefs of the product qualities of are v˜m and
v˜r respectively. v˜i(i = m, r) is equal to the true quality vi if the quality
information is disclosed, or v¯i if no information is disclosed (v˜i ∈ {vi, v¯i}).
Similar to chapter 3, v¯i is the inferred quality of product i conditioning on
the no disclosure activity from the seller. The values of v˜i are observed by
all parties at the time when the retail prices are set.
Consider the following five-stage game. In the first stage, the manufacturer
distributes a brand M through the retailer, and the retailer introduces a re-
tailer brand at a cost F with F normalized to zero (soR is always introduced).
All product qualities are realized upon production. In the second stage, the
manufacturer makes a decision on disclosure based on the optimal disclosure
strategy defined by the threshold quality level vˆm. When vm > vˆm, the man-
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ufacturer chooses to disclose the information of M , whereas when vm ≤ vˆm,
the quality information is not revealed. Buyers, including the retailer and
consumers, can infer from the non-disclosure action that the product quality
is v¯m = vˆm/2. In the third stage, the retailer determines whether to disclose
the quality for R or not (v˜r ∈ {v¯r, vr}) based on the optimal disclosure strat-
egy defined by vˆr after observing the quality from the manufacturer brand
v˜m where v˜m ∈ {vm, v¯m}. In the fourth stage, the manufacturer charges a
wholesale price w to the retailer for distributing the manufacturer product.
In the last stage, the retailer sets the retailer prices pm and pr. Consumer
observe the product quality v˜m and v˜r as well as the retail prices pm and pr,
and purchase the product to maximize their individual utilities.
4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 Benchmark Case: No Retailer Brand
As a benchmark case, I first study the distribution of a manufacturer brand
as a monopoly brand in the decentralized channel. Since the observed quality
for M is v˜m, and the demand for the manufacturer brand is qm = 1 − pmv˜m ,




. The manufacturer optimizes pim = wqm − dmc, and the first
order optimization leads to w∗ = v˜m/2. At the stage to make disclosure
strategy, the manufacturer choose between withholding or disclosing prod-
uct information. Following the same argument is chapter 3, to make the
disclosing strategy credible, the manufacturer is indifferent between keeping
silent or disclosing quality information when vm = vˆm, which requires that
vˆm/8−c = v¯m/8 = vˆm/16. Hence the optimal disclosure strategy vˆdm = 16cm.
Compared with the optimal quality disclosure strategy in a coordinated
channel, where vˆcm = 8cm, the manufacturer reveals less information when it
sells through a decentralized channel. This is because quality disclosure gen-
erates a lower marginal benefit for the manufacturer, reducing its incentive
to reveal product information.
Based on the optimal disclosure strategy, in the decentralized channel, the
retailer earns an ex post profit of pidr = vˆm/16, and the manufacturer gets
pidm = vˆm/8 − dmcm, with vˆm ∈ {vm, v¯m}. The ex ante profit, which is the
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profit retailer and manufacturer expect to receive prior to the realization of














vm/8− c dvm = 1/16− (1− 16cm)cm. (4.2)
Similar to Guo and Zhao (2009), the manufacturer’s equilibrium ex ante
profit first decreases then increases with cm. At small cm, vˆm = 16cm is small,
and the manufacturer is likely to disclose product information, which always
incurs a cost cm. The negative effect of incurred disclosure cost dominates
manufacturer’s payoff, hence E(pim) decreases with cm. With the increase of
cm, the manufacturer can credibly withhold its quality information. More-
over, it is able to maintain a high average quality expectation from consumers
(v¯m = 8cm which increases with cm) even no information is revealed. Hence
the positive effect of information withholding overshadows the negative cost
effect, leading to an increase of the manufacturer’s profit with disclosure cost
cm.
4.2.2 With Retailer Brand Introduction
Consider the case where a retailer brand R has been introduced by the re-
tailer at no cost. At the pricing stages where the manufacturer determines
the wholesale price w for brand M , and the retailers subsequently charges
the retailer prices pm and pr, I first assume that the observed quality for
manufacturer brand is higher than the retailer brand (v˜m > v˜r). The mar-
ket is segmented such that the consumers who are willing to pay more for
quality would purchase the manufacturer brand, and the consumers who are
willing to pay less for quality in trade for price would purchase the retailer
brand. The demand for M and R are qm = 1 − pm−prv˜m−v˜r and qr =
pmv˜r−pr v˜m
(v˜m−v˜r)v˜r
respectively. By optimizing retailer’s profit pir = (pm − w)qm + prqr − drcr








. Observing the retailer’s optimal response, the manufacturer’s
profit is given by pim = w(
v˜m−v˜r−w





If the observed manufacturer brand quality is lower than that for the re-
tailer brand ( v˜m ≤ v˜r), the retailer prefers to carry the high quality retailer
brand only and forgo the manufacturer brand since the marginal cost to sell R







. The manufacturer can not initiate any sales and gets pim = 0.
Based on the above analysis, the retailer and the manufacturer’s optimal




− bmcm, pir = v˜m+3v˜r16 − brcr if v˜r < v˜m;
pim = 0, pir =
v˜r
4
− brcr if v˜r ≥ v˜m.
(4.3)
Retailer Brand Quality Disclosure
Knowing the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s pricing strategies at stage 4
and stage 5, I analyze the retailer’s optimal strategy to disclose vr at stage 3.
The retailer takes the advantage to observe the disclosure behavior from the
manufacturer before it determines vˆr. Consequently, its disclosure strategy is
contingent on the observed quality from the manufacturer brand v˜m, where
v˜m ∈ {v¯m, vm}. By withholding information, the observable quality of the
retailer brand is the average quality contingent on the action of no disclosure













if v¯r < v˜m;
v¯r
4
if v¯r ≥ v˜m.
(4.4)
By disclosing quality information for R, the observed quality for R is the





− cr if vr < v˜m;
vr
4
− cr if vr ≥ v˜m.
(4.5)
To make the disclosure strategy credible, it must also be true that when
vr = vˆr, the retailer is indifferent between keeping silent and disclosure. This
translates to pir|silent = pir|disclose(vr = vˆr).
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Therefore, the optimal disclosure strategy for retailer is:
vˆ∗r =












v∗r is the threshold quality beyond which retailer will disclose, that is, when
vr > vˆ
∗
r , the retailer chooses to disclose the quality information for its brand.
When vr ≤ vˆ∗r , the retailer choose not to reveal any information, and keep
silent.
Lemma 4.1 The retailer’s optimal quality disclosure strategy vˆ∗r does not de-
pend on the observed quality from the manufacturer brand (v˜m) when the
observed manufacturer brand quality is low (v˜m ≤ 4cr) or when the manu-
facturer brand quality is high (v˜m >
32
3
cr). Only when the observed manufac-
turer brand quality is intermediate (4cr < v˜m ≤ 323 cr) is the retailer’s optimal
quality disclosure strategy contingent on v˜m. In this case, the retailer be-










Interestingly, the retailer’s strategy to disclose its product quality does
not always depend on v˜m even it has the advantage to make a decision after
observing v˜m. In fact, vˆr depends on v˜m only when v˜m takes moderate values.




its interest is to keep M to target high segment consumers while targeting R
to consumers who do not hold high valuation toward quality. Disregarding
the retailer’s decision to withhold or disclose the information of its own brand
R, the incentive to sell M persists. More specifically, at vr = vˆr, the retailer’s
strategy is to sell M no matter it keeps silent or not. Hence the retailer’s
disclosure strategy becomes independent of v˜m. Likewise, when the observed
manufacturer’s quality is very low v˜m ≤ 4cr, the retailer always rejects the
manufacturer brand M but to sell the more efficient retailer brand R instead,
and vˆr is not a function of v˜m either. When the level of v˜m is moderate
(4cr < v˜m ≤ 323 cr), the retailer’s decision is to keep M when its realized vr
is low (vr < vˆr), but to cut M when its realized vr is high (vr > vˆr). The
decision to keep or to forgo the manufacturer brand is closely associated with
how much more profit can be generated when the retailer continues to sell
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M . Hence the decision to sell M is closely coupled with the retailer’s decision
to discloses its product information, and vˆr becomes dependent on v˜m.
Also notice that this result is different from a sequential disclosure game
in a duopoly competition as studied by Guo and Zhao (2009). In their cases,
the disclosure follower (corresponds to the retailer here) adopts a disclosure
strategy which is always a function of the disclosure leader (corresponds to
the manufacturer here). The follower disclosure strategy is depends on the
leader since the follower will receive zero profit if the leader’s product quality
turns out to be high. However, in the channel context, the retailer also shares
part of the manufacturer’s profit and is interested in leveraging the sales for
all brands instead of always undercutting the manufacturer brand. Therefore
there are conditions under which the retailer’s equilibrium disclosure strategy
does not depend on the manufacturer brand quality. A further comparison
with the duopoly sequential quality disclosure is illustrated in section 4.5.1.
Manufacturer Brand Quality Disclosure
The manufacturer predicts the reaction from the retailer to determine its
equilibrium quality disclosure strategy vˆm. The expected payoff (gross cm) of
the manufacturer conditioning on the disclosure strategy of the retailer can
be expressed as the following:
E(pim) =

0 if v˜m ≤ 4cr;
1
25





To credibly commit to a disclosure strategy, it must be true that when
vm = vˆm, the manufacturer becomes indifferent and E(pim(vˆm)) − cm =
E(pim(v¯m)). Based on this notion, the optimal quality disclosure strategy





cm + 4c2r if cm ∈ [0, 9625c2r);
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Figure 4.1: The optimal disclosure threshold vˆm as a function of cm and cr.
The top plot shows vˆm as a function of cm with cr =
1
16
. The solid line is
with retailer brand, dashed line is the benchmark case where R is absent.




It must also satisfy the constraint that vˆm can not go beyond one (vˆm ≤ 1),
since vˆm = 1 represents no disclosure at all.
From figure 4.1(a), the manufacturer switch to a higher vˆm with the intro-
duction of a retailer brand, indicating that the manufacturer becomes more
conservative towards information disclosure. Apparently, the optimal quality
disclosure is also a function of both cm and cr, except for higher cm where
vˆm = 8
√
cm/3 and is independent of cr. The change of vˆm as a function of
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Proposition 4.1 (1) With the introduction of a retailer brand R, the man-
ufacturer becomes less likely to disclose quality information (vˆm > vˆ
d
m). The
incentive to disclose also increases with the disclosure cost cm (∂vˆm/∂cm > 0).




cm) and then increases (
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c2r ≥ cm) with retailer’s disclosure cost cr.
As shown in figure 4.1(a), I find the manufacturer becomes less likely
to disclose product quality when a retailer brand is added to the product
category. Without the introduction of a retailer brand, the manufacturer’s










−cm) dvm. The first term is
the manufacturer’s expected profit when it keeps silent, the second term is the
profit gain from information revelation. Since vˆm(cm) increases with cm, the
first term increases with cm, while the second term decreases with cm. When
a retailer brand is introduced, the profit becomes pim =
∫ vˆm
0
pim(v¯m) dvm +∫ 1
vˆm
(pim(vm) − cm) dvm, with pi′(vm) = vm−v˜r8 if v˜r < vm; pi′(vm) = 0 if
v˜r ≥ vm. Apparently, the overall profit for the manufacturer decreases with
the existence of a retailer brand encroaching the sales. Worse still, when
the quality of the retailer brand exceeds that of the manufacturer brand, the
manufacturer can not initiate any sales and ends up with zero payoffs. One
might be tempted to think that the manufacturer will act more aggressively
towards the retailer brand, leading to a lower vˆm and an elevated incentive
to disclose information. However, the results show that less information is
disclosed. By revealing information below vˆm, the manufacturer may gain
additional revenue through disclosure if there is no retailer brand. But with
the presence of retailer brand competition, there is less gain of revenue, while
the cost of revelation becomes more significant. In fact the manufacturer
prefers to conceal more information to maintain the perceived quality when
manufacturer is silent (v¯m).
I also find vˆm varies with both its own cost to disclose (cm) as well as
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the retailer’s cost of disclosure (cr). First, I analyze the change of vˆm with
cm. In general, the disclosure threshold vˆm increases with cm, indicating that
the manufacturer would disclose less information when cm increases. This is
because the higher the cm, the more costly it becomes for the manufacturer to
reveal product information. The manufacturer is able to credibly convince
the other buyers that its non-disclosure action is mainly due to the high
disclosure cost and commit to disclose less of product information.
In contrast to the monotonic relationship between vˆm and cm, vˆm may














), vˆm decreases with cr (∂vˆm/∂cr < 0); and for large
cr vˆm increases with cr (∂vˆm/∂cr > 0). A forward-looking manufacturer pre-
dicts the possible move from the retailer in disclosing or concealing product
information. Because the threat of competition is severe if v˜m < v˜r, the
manufacturer responds by increasing the probability leading to v˜m > v˜r to
secure its stand in the market. For very low cr, the manufacturer knows
that the retailer is likely to engage in information revealing due to low cost.
Then vˆm is independent of cr since the retailer’s decision to disclose does not
affect the manufacturer’s choice to disclose or reveal product information.









with cr, indicating that the manufacturer is willing to disclose more infor-
mation as cr increases. In this range, E(pim) =
v˜2m
16
− cm or 116 vˆr(2vm − vˆr)




when it keeps silent (dm = 0). It is easy to see that E(pim) is irrelevant
of cr or decreases less with cr when the manufacturer reveals quality, but
E(pim) decreases more rapidly with cr when dm = 0. Hence with the increase
of cr, the manufacturer expected profit is unchanged when with disclosure
but decreases with information concealing. This motivates the manufacturer
to decrease vˆm, resulting in a higher likelihood for the manufacturer to dis-








vˆr(2vm − vˆr) when dm = 1 and E(pim) = 0 when dm = 0. since
E(pim) decreases faster with cr when dm = 1, the manufacturer will suffer
from a greater profit loss with disclosure than with concealing when cr in-
creases. Hence, the manufacturer has higher incentive to hide more product
information other than revealing them.
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This finding can also be interpreted from the relative competitiveness from
the retailer brand. With moderate relative cr, the retailer brand poses a
threat to the manufacturer brand only when the realized quality vm < vˆm,
at which M will be sold only when the retailer does not disclose (vr < vˆr).
When cr becomes higher, so does vˆr, and the retailer brand becomes higher
of a threat as the perceived retailer brand quality v¯r increases. To deal with
the competition, the manufacturer reduces the likelihood to hide product
information. With high relative cr, the retailer brand quality is only rel-
evant when the manufacturer discloses information, since when vm < vˆm,
the manufacturer can never initiate any sales due to the low quality image.
With the increase of cr, the threat from the retailer brand is greater, and the
manufacturer become less willing to disclose. This result also implies that
when the cost to disclose for the retailer is moderately low such that retailer
is likely to disclose, the perceived quality from the manufacturer brand sur-
passes the retailer only when both keep silent or the manufacturer discloses
while the retailer conceals information. With higher retailer disclosure cost,
the retailer keeps a high quality image even it does not reveal information,
and the manufacturer can deliver a high quality image only when it discloses
information.
I also analyze the retailer’s equilibrium disclosure strategy. Compared
with the disclosure strategy (vˆm) from the manufacturer, the retailer may or
may not disclose more product information depending on the relative cost of
disclosure. Retailer’s likelihood to disclose compared with the manufacturer
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) < vˆm < vˆm
Proposition 4.2 Compared with the manufacturer’s disclosure strategy, the




and with the manufacturer revealing its product quality; or when 0 < vˆm < 8cr
and with the manufacturer withholding product information. Otherwise, the
retailer is more likely to disclose product quality compared with the manufac-
turer (vˆr < vˆm).
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In general, the retailer becomes more willing to disclose product qual-
ity relative to the manufacturer with the increase of vˆm. The increase of
vˆm corresponds to the increase of cm relative to cr. The incentives to dis-
close are driven by the costs of disclosure. With smaller(large) cm
c2r
the re-
tailer(manufacturer) may be able to commit to less information disclosure
due to the higher disclosing expenditure. More interestingly, I observe ac-
tion for the retailer to disclose product quality is closely related to the manu-
facturer’s action of concealing or disclosing product information. Especially
when 8cr < vˆm <
32
3
cr, the retailer becomes more wiling to reveal if the
manufacturer keeps silent, but less willing to disclose when the manufacturer
discloses information, indicating that the retailer has a tendency to differen-
tiate.
Profit Implications
Manufacturer ex ante profit
Prior to realizing the quality of either manufacturer brand or the retailer
brand, the manufacturer and retailer approximate the ex ante expected prof-
its according to the distribution of the product quality. The ex ante profit
is a measure of how much payoffs the manufacturer and the retailer expecte
to receive by distributing the manufacturer and the retailer brands prior to
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The manufacturer ex ante profit E(pim) first decreases then increases with cm.
This “U” shape relationship is similar to the benchmark case. By the same
argument, at lower cm, the manufacturer suffers from the cost to disclose
and E(pim) decreases with cm. At higher cm, the disclosure cost helps the
manufacturer credibly hide unfavorable information to maintain a quality
image even when no information is revealed. This positive effect from cm
becomes dominant as cm increases, resulting in the “U” shape relationship
between E(pim) and cm.
I also find E(pim) weakly decreases with cr (∂E(pim)/∂cr ≤ 0), indicating
that the manufacturer loses profit as retailer disclosure cost increases. This
is counterintuitive as one would expect that the manufacturer will receive
higher payoff when it becomes more expensive for the retailer to disclose.




cm), the manufacturer’s payoff
is unaffected by cr (∂E(pim)/∂cr = 0). This is also reflected from the fact that
vˆm is independent of cr, where the retailer is much likely to disclose compared
with the manufacturer, and manufacturer ex ante payoff is independent of
the retailer’s disclosure decisions.
Interestingly, when cr is relatively high, the manufacturer ex ante profit
decreases with cr. With the increase of cr, the retailer becomes less likely to
ex post disclose product quality. This reduces the retailer’s action of creating
product differentiation through disclosure, but also boosts buyers’ perceived
quality of the retailer brand when the retailer keeps silent, creating severe
cannibalization against the manufacturer brand. I find this negative effect
dominating the manufacturer’s profit as cr increases. An examination of the
manufacturer’s expected profit conditioning on vr confirms with this finding.




cr. However, for 4cr < v˜m ≤ 323 cr, Evr(pim) = 116 vˆr(2v˜m−vˆr) and
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decreases as vˆr becomes higher. Therefore, when the retailer conceals product
quality, the negative cannibalization effect drives down the manufacturer’s
payoff as cr increases.
Retailer ex ante profit







− cr − 5cmcr + 323 c2r − 2243 c3r − 56cm
√


























− cr + 26449 cmcr − 240641029 c3r − 130441√3cm
√

















By the same argument, the retailer’s payoff E(pir) assemble a “U” shape curve




of cm, I find that E(pir) decreases with cm except when 8.17c
2
r < cm <
64
3
c2r. Though the manufacturer gets worse off when quality of R becomes
higher, the retailer benefits from a strong manufacturer brand, and its profit
increases with v˜m when v˜m > v˜r. When cm increases, v˜m = v¯m increases
if the manufacturer keeps silent, hence may benefit the retailer when v¯m >
v˜r. However, there is smaller chance for the manufacturer to realize higher
v˜m = vm and differentiate from the retailer brand, which negatively affects
the retailer’s profit. Another negative effect arises when v˜m = v¯m becomes
very high and the retailer is not able to justify the higher quality of a retailer
brand against the manufacturer brand. Therefore, for cm ≤ 8.17c2r, the
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retailer suffers from not being able to differentiate high quality manufacturer
brand, but for 8.17c2r < cm <
64
3
c2r, the retailer benefits when cm increases as
the positive effect from concealing surpass the negative effect. When cm is
very high (cm ≥ 643 c2r), the retailer suffers from the manufacturer being able
to differentiate its own brand, and E(pir) again decreases with cm.
4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 Lower Quality Retailer Brand
Retailer brands are usually perceived as lower quality substitutes compared
with manufacturer brand. To account for the effect of lower retailer brand
quality, I examine a more general case where the average quality of a retailer
brand R is generally lower than the quality of the manufacturer brand. I
assume that the quality of a retailer brand is uniformly distributed from 0
to a with a < 1 and with probability density function f(.) = 1
a
. For the ease
of exposition, I consider the case if the cost to reveal product quality is the




















(6 + 25a− 5√4− 20a+ 41a2) which is the cost beyond which
vˆ∗m = 1 and the manufacturer always withholds quality information.
The optimal quality disclosure is a function of both c and a. vˆm increases
with c, since the incentive to disclose decreases when the cost becomes higher.
Compare with the case where the retailer brand is not introduced and vˆdm =
16c, the manufacturer have less incentive to disclose its quality information
whenever c < min{5a
48
, c1}. Otherwise, the disclosure strategy converges to
the benchmark case (vˆm = vˆ
d
m).
Keeping the quality distribution of the retailer brand constant, the proba-
bility for the manufacturer to disclose first decreases rapidly, then decreases
slowly with c (vˆm is a concave function of c with
∂2vˆm
∂c2
< 0). This indicates
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Figure 4.4: The optimal disclosure threshold vˆm as a function of c, with
a = 0.5. The solid line is with retailer brand, dashed line is the benchmark
case. The x-axis is c, the y-axis is vˆm.
that the impact of a retailer brand is most salient when disclosure cost is
relatively low.
The distribution of the retailer brand quality (a) also plays a role in de-













21a2−160ac+256c2 ) > 0 if c ∈ [3a64 ,min{5a48 , c1}];
0 Otherwise.
(4.11)
Proposition 4.3 (1) With the presence of a retailer brand R, the manufac-
turer becomes less likely to disclose quality information when c < min{5a
48
, c1}.
Otherwise, the manufacturer chooses the same disclosure strategy with/without
a retailer brand.
(2) The equilibrium disclosure threshold vˆm increases with a (∂vˆm/∂a ≥ 0),
indicating that the manufacturer has less incentive to disclose as the average
quality of the retailer brand increases. vˆm is most sensitive to a when the
cost to disclose is moderately high (c = 3a
64
).
With a fixed disclosure cost c, the probability to disclose for the manu-
facturer decreases as a increases (∂vˆm
∂a
≥ 0), indicating that as the averaging
retailer quality increases, the manufacturer becomes less likely to reveal its
quality information. This is intuitive since with the increases of a, the manu-
facturer perceives that the retailer brand will likely to bear a higher quality,
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Figure 4.5: The optimal disclosure threshold vˆr as a function of c, with
a = 0.5. The solid line is when dm = 1, dashed line is when dm = 0.
which poses a more compelling competitive threat to the manufacturer brand,
and the expected payoff of manufacturer decreases in general. Moreover, vˆm




shows that when c is moderately low, the manufacturer is most susceptible
to the quality distribution of the retailer brand, but with very low or high
disclosure cost, the disclosure strategy is less sensitive to a. With very low
c, the manufacturer can not credibly engage itself into withholding much
product information due to the low disclosure cost. The threat of increased
retailer brand quality is outweighed by the urge to disclose product quality.
To another extreme, when c is very high (c > min{5a
48
, c1}), manufacturer
has very low incentive to disclose since information disclosure incurs a sig-
nificant cost, and the change of retailer brand quality does not dominate
the disclosure strategy from the manufacturer. With moderately low c, the
manufacturer profit changes drastically with a, leading to a greater change
of the equilibrium disclosure strategy.
Retailer’s optimal quality disclosure strategy
In reaction to the quality disclosure action from the manufacturer, the
retailer decides its own quality disclosure strategy. When the manufacturer
reveals quality information (dm = 1), v
∗
r = min{323 c, a}. When the manu-






















As shown in Figure 4.5, when the manufacturer keeps silence (dm = 0),
the retailer has higher incentive to reveal more information if the disclosure
cost 3a
32
< c < 5a
48
.
Proposition 4.4 With same disclosure cost c, the retailer always has a
higher incentive to disclose its brand quality at any given product quality
level(vˆr < vˆm).
In contrast to Proposition 4.2 which shows that the retailer can be more
(less) likely to disclose product quality when cr is relatively low (high), I find
when cm = cr = c, the retailer has higher incentive to disclose compared with
the manufacturer (vˆr < vˆm) at a given product quality level. This implies that
if the cost and technology to conduct product quality disclosure are the same
across the manufacturer and the retailer, the retailer, given the same quality
level, is more willing to disclose than the manufacturer. The retailer utilizes
the second-mover advantage, and is more motivated to differentiate from the
manufacturer brand which leads to a higher incentive to disclose its product
quality. This result also differs from Guo and Zhao (2009) who claims that
the disclosure follower has less incentive to disclose compared with the leader
(vˆfollower > vˆleader) for small c, but has higher incentive (vˆfollower < vˆleader) for
higher c. To see the difference, notice that the nature of competition in the
manufacturer-retailer setting is different from the sequential disclosure game
described by Guo and Zhao (2009). In their cases, the disclosure follower’s
optimal disclosure strategy is always an increasing function of the observed
quality from the leader (vˆfollower = min{v˜leader + c, 1}). When c is small,
the leader is likely to reveal quality information (v˜leader = vleader) and the
follower has incentive to hide information to avoid head-to-head competition.
However, in this setting, the retailer also gains from the sales of manufacturer
brand, and whenever v˜m is very high, the incentive of the retailer is to sell
M to consumers with higher requirement for product quality while target
R to the lower segment consumers. Since it is always the interest of the
retailer to carry the high quality M , the retailer only leverages the sales of
retailer brand and manufacturer brand. In reaction to the manufacturer’s




which is independent of v˜m, and the retailer can have higher incentive to
disclose its product quality compared with the manufacturer.
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If I define the probability to disclose on the whole quality spectrum, and the
likelihood to reveal quality information for the retailer is Prob(vr > vˆ
∗
r) = 1−
vˆ∗r/a, and for the manufacturer it is P (vm > vˆ
∗
m) = 1− vˆ∗m. According to this
definition, the retailer can be less likely to reveal quality information when
its average quality is low and at higher disclosure cost (i.e. a < 1/2 and c >





4.3.2 Wholesale Price Change and Channel Efficiency
Implication
Channel inefficiencies may occur when the manufacturer brand is distributed
through the decentralized channel, where the manufacturer and the retailer’s
interests are not well aligned. Because the retailer is optimizing its own profit
at a cost of the wholesale price charged by the manufacturer, channel decen-
tralization results in higher retail price and decreased overall channel profit.
Mills (1995) show that by carrying a substitutable store brand, a retailer is
able to lower the wholesale price charged for the national brand, and the
net effect improves the overall channel performance. However, does store
brand introduction always reduce the wholesale price and mitigate double
marginalization? In the context of retailer brand introduction, I examine the
wholesale price in a decentralized channel (wd) with the wholesale price w
where a retailer brand R has been introduced. In a decentralized channel,
the wholesale charged by the manufacturer and the retailer margin are:
wd =
{





ex post wholesale price
If the retailer brand is introduced the wholesale price becomes w = max{ v˜m−v˜r
2
, 0},
and the margin for retailer is pm − w = v˜m+v˜r4 if v˜m ≥ v˜r or ∞ if v˜m < v˜r.
Now I compare w with wd.
















, 0} if dm = 0, dr = 1;
max{vm−vr
2
, 0} if dm = 1, dr = 1.
(4.14)
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I find w > wd when dm = 0, dr = 0 and c <
3a
100
, or when dm = 0, dr = 1
and c < 1
24
(a −√a(a− 6vr) − 3vr) for vm ≤ 16c and c < 3a16(vm + vr)2 for




. Otherwise w ≤ wd.
(2) If 3a
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v¯m − 165 c if dm = 0, dr = 0;
max{1
2
v¯m − vr2 , 0} if dm = 0, dr = 1;
max{vm−vr
2





(−48c + 25a − 5√256c2 − 160ac+ 21a2). I find within the
range it is always the case that w < wd.
(3)If c ≥ min{5a
48
, c1}, then w = wd− a4 , the introduction of a retailer brand
does not affect the manufacturer’s disclosure strategy, however, w < wd.
In summary, from the ex post wholesale price change show that w > wd
when dm = 0, dr = 0 and c <
3a
100
, or when dm = 0, dr = 1 and c <
1
24
(a−√a(a− 6vr)− 3vr). This shows that the manufacturer may charge a
higher wholesale, instead of a lower wholesale in face of downstream compe-
tition from the retailer brand. There are two interplaying mechanism which
determines w. The competition effect from a retailer brand, and the man-
ufacturer’s tendency to withhold information as a consequence of the profit
reduction. In reaction to the direct competition from a retailer brand, the
manufacturer lowers its price to motivate the retailer. However, due to the
competition, the manufacturer has a higher incentive to withhold product
information (v¯m > v¯
d
m). This is demonstrated in the ex post wholesale price
charged by the manufacturer when the manufacturer chooses to conceal the
product information, it then charges w = v¯m−v˜r
2
, which can be higher than
wd if c is small. As previously stated, vˆm is most sensitive to the threat of a
retailer brand introduction when c is low, and vˆm increases significantly with
the retailer brand introduction. Although w decreases by v˜r
2
to account for
competition, the manufacturer can credibly raise the price by v¯m
2
− 4c and
the overall ex post wholesale price can be higher than wd.
ex ante wholesale price
The ex ante wholesale price change for the manufacturer measures the
overall wholesale price change with respect to all possible v˜r. For instance,
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if vˆr ≤ v˜m ≤ a;
4
25a





if a < v˜m < 1.
(4.16)
I find that the ex ante wholesale price when a retailer brand introduction is
always lower than the wholesale price in the monopoly decentralized channel
(E(w) < E(wd)), and the retailer receives higher gross margin from dis-
tributing the manufacturer brand. This indicates that aside from the profit
from the retailer brand, the retailer performance in distributing the man-
ufacturer brand improves at the expense of the manufacturer. This result
also implies that the although the manufacturer quality disclosure incentive
is lower with a retailer brand introduction, this does not offset the channel
efficiency brought about by the retailer brand competition.
4.3.3 Different Disclosure Sequence
Consider a different disclosure sequence where the retailer discloses the prod-
uct quality first, followed by the manufacturer who determines the equilib-
rium disclosure strategy based on observation from the retailer. From the
manufacturer’s perspective, the best reaction is:
vˆ∗m =
{
16cm if v˜r ≤ 8cm;
min{8cm + v˜r, 1} otherwise.
(4.17)





cr if cr ≤ 34cm;
1
2





cr − 2 otherwise.
(4.18)
The manufacturer’s reaction to the retailer’s quality disclosure shows that
vˆm > vˆ
d
m = 16cm. Hence even with a different sequence of disclosure, the
manufacturer still has a reduced incentive to disclose compared with the
benchmark case.





(−3+√9 + 256c2 + 128c) < 16c,
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and vˆ∗m = 16c if dr = 0 or vˆ
∗
m = min{8c + v˜r, 1} if dr = 1. In all these cases
vˆm ≥ 16c > vˆr. Even with reversed disclosure sequence, the manufacturer
has reduced incentive to disclose compared with the retailer.
4.4 Conclusion
It has become a popular trend for retail stores to introduce retailer brands,
creating competition against the manufacturer brands. However, little has
been studied on how manufacturers and retailers act on product quality infor-
mation disclosure with the presence of retailer store brands. In this chapter,
I study the manufacturer’s voluntary quality disclosure when a retailer intro-
duces a retailer brand. In general, I find that the introduction of a retailer
brand creates competition against the manufacturer brand, making it more
costly for the manufacturer to conduct quality disclosure. As a result, the
manufacturer is less likely to reveal product quality. The equilibrium qual-
ity disclosure strategy of the manufacturer is a function of the disclosure
cost from the manufacturer as well as from the retailer. As disclosure gets
more expensive, the manufacturer is less likely to disclose. However, when
the disclosure cost from the retailer increases, the manufacturer’s incentive
to disclose first weakly increases then decreases. This implies that depend-
ing on the magnitude of the retailer disclosure cost, a manufacturer may
react differently in revealing information. The retailer’s disclosure strategy
depends on the observed quality from the manufacturer only when the cost
to disclose is moderate. With very small or high cost, the retailer’s disclo-
sure strategy becomes independent of the manufacturer. Compared with the
manufacturer, the retailer has higher incentive to disclose when its disclosure
cost is relatively low, while when the cost to disclose becomes higher for the
retailer, it has less incentive to disclose.
Manufacturer and retailer ex ante profits are also functions of the disclosure
costs. Both manufacturer and retailer payoffs are “U” shape functions of its
own cost to disclose (cm and cr respectively). When the cost to disclose
becomes high, the manufacturer and the retailer can save the cost to disclose
while still take advantage of consumers higher willingness to pay when they
keep silent. However, I find manufacturer profit decreases with the retailer
disclosure cost, while the retailer profit first decreases then increases and
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decreases again with the manufacturer’s disclosure cost.
I also examine the effect of a lower quality retailer brand distribution with
all disclosure costs being equal. Not surprisingly, the manufacturer is more
willing to disclose when the average retailer brand quality is low, and the
manufacturer’s disclosure strategy is most sensitive if the size of disclosure
cost is relatively low. Interestingly,given the disclosure costs are homoge-
nous, the retailer always has higher incentive to disclose compared with the
manufacturer. Unlike in the duopoly competition where the retailer reveals
less information with low cost of disclosure to avoid direct competition with
the manufacturer, in the channel setting, the retailer leverages the informa-
tion from the retailer brand to optimize its joint profits from selling both the
manufacturer brand and the retailer brand, resulting in a different incentive
to disclose.
This research has managerial implications on channel quality advertising
in the context of a retailer brand introduction. While past literature mainly
focuses on price promotion of manufacturer brands and store brands, this
study show that manufacturer may have a different incentive to advertise
for product quality with/without a store brand introduction. The strategic
disclosure strategy changes with marketing variables such as the disclosure




In the three essays, I study the retailer brand introduction and its impact
on information asymmetry under decentralized distribution channels. It has
become a popular trend for the in-store retailers to introduce store brands.
Through managing and selling brands of their own, retailers may enjoy the
higher price margin as well as increased bargaining power against other man-
ufacturer brand. This dissertation focuses on the condition under which a
store brand introduction interacts with channel members incentive to resolve
information asymmetry as well as the payoff implications.
In general, retailers introduce two types of store brands -premium store
brand and copycat store brand. The premium store brand is quality equiv-
alent to the manufacturer brand, but is horizontally differentiated to target
untapped consumer segments. The copycat store brand, also known as the
traditional house brand, is merely the low quality alternative compared with
manufacturer brands. It is only vertically differentiated from the manufac-
turer brand. In the dissertation, I examine the two types of store brand
introduction and their implication to the distribution channel information
dissemination.
In essay 1, I study the impact of a premium store brand to consumer in-
centives to evaluate in order to resolve preference uncertainty. When retailer
brings this type of store brand into the product category, consumers perceive
higher benefit from conducting product evaluation, and the firm can take ad-
vantage of that to exploit increased reservation price from consumers as they
eliminate preference uncertainty. Surprisingly, a manufacturer also benefit
from a premium store brand introduction from free riding on the retailers
heightened interest to induce consumer evaluation.
In essay 2 and essay 3, I examine the manufacturers incentive to reveal
private information of product information in a decentralized channel and
in a channel with downstream threat from a retailer brand. Conventional
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wisdom suggests that a manufacturer suffers from channel inefficiencies arise
from the channel decentralization. Essay 2 shows that under some product
quality distribution, a manufacturer may benefit from channel decentraliza-
tion since the channel inefficiencies facilitate information withholding when
the manufacturer brand quality is less favorable. Essay 3 shows that the
manufacturer incentive to withhold is further reduced when a retailer intro-
duces a copycat retailer brand. The result implies that a manufacturer will
be more conservative in quality advertising when the retailer introduces a
retailer brand. What is more, the manufacturer and the retailer interaction
in a distribution channel manifests both collaboration and competition. As a
result, the retailer does not act adversely when the manufacturer is likely to
disclose quality with low disclosure cost, and the retailer always has a higher
incentive to advertise quality compared with the manufacturer.
Although a body of literature has theoretically and empirically tested the
impact of store brand introduction and channel member reaction, my dis-
sertation specifically deals with its impact to the flow of information in a
distribution channel. I hope this dissertation can add to our understanding




Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Consumers make evaluation decisions by comparing their expected payoffs
(E(UE) and E(UE)) at the first stage. For a consumer to choose evaluation,
it must be satisfied that E(UE) ≥ E(UE). This requires that α(1−pM)−c ≥
α− pM for pM ≤ α; or α(1− pM)− c ≥ 0 for α < pM ≤ 1. Therefore, when
c ≤ α(1−α) and c
1−α ≤ pM ≤ 1− cα , consumers choose to evaluate the product
in the first stage. Otherwise, consumers will choose not to conduct product
evaluation. After product evaluation, only consumers with who prefers M
will choose to purchase. Without product evaluation, consumers purchase M
if and only if pM < min{ c1−α , α}. The results can be summarized as follows:
EM if prefer &
c
1−α ≤ pM ≤ 1− cα , c ≤ α(1− α);
E0 if donotprefer &
c
1−α ≤ pM ≤ 1− cα , c ≤ α(1− α);
EM if pM < min{ c1−α , α};
E0 otherwise.
(A.1)
Given consumers’ optimal choice sets, consider the subgame where the
retailer only sells M . We first identify the retailer’s optimal price, then I find
the equilibrium w charged by the manufacturer to optimize the profit given
the retailer’s pricing reaction function. Since piEMR = pM−w = min{ c1−α , α}−
w and piEMR = α(pM −w) = α(1− cα −w), the retailer chooses to induce EM
with a low price if and only if piEMR ≥ max{piEMR , 0}. This requires that
w ≤ min{ (2−α)c−α(1−α)
(1−α)2 , α}, and the manufacturer receives profit piEMM =
wEM = min{ (2−α)c−α(1−α)
(1−α)2 , α}. The retailer chooses to induce EM with a high
price if and only if piEMR ≥ max{piEMR , 0}. This requires that α(pEMM − w) ≥
max{pEMM −w}, hence wEM = 1− cα . In this case, the manufacturer receives
piEMM = αw
EM = α − c. The manufacturer’s profit is the w that optimizes
piM , and hence the optimal channel members’ profits are
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







(1−α)2 if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1− α)];
piEMM = α, pi
EM
R = 0 otherwise.
(A.2)
Consider the other subgame where R is introduced at a cost F . The
retailer’s profit is piR = α(p
Ei
M − w) + (1 − α)pEiR − F if Ei is induced; piR =
(1 − α)pERR − F if ER is induced; piR = pEMM − w − F if EM is induced; and
piR = p
ER
R − F if ER is induced. The optimal pEiM and pEiR should satisfy
αpEiM + (1− α)pEiR = 1− c and c1−α − 1 ≤ pEiM − pEiR ≤ 1− cα . To induce ER,
the retailer charges pERR = 1− c1−α where c ≤ α(1− α), and a high price for
M (pM > 1) such that consumers ignore the existence of M . To induce EM ,
the optimal pEMM = min{α, c1−α} and pERR = min{1− α, cα}.
The manufacturer’s profit is piM = αw if Ei is induced; piM = w if EM
is induced; otherwise, the manufacturer only receives piM = 0. Hence, the
manufacturer sells M only when the retailer chooses to induce Ei or EM . In
order for the retailer to induce Ei, the manufacturer charges a w that satisfies
















Similarly, to induce EM , w must satisfy p
EM
M −w−F ≥ max{α(pEiM−w)+(1−
α)pEiR − F, (1− α)pERR − F, pERR − F, 0}. This requires that wEM = c1−α − 1
for c > (1 − α). The manufacturer chooses the w that optimizes its profit
piM . The equilibrium manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits are:
(piM , piR) =








− F ) if c ∈ (α(1−α)
1+α
, α(1− α)];
(α− c, 1− α− F ) if c ∈ (α(1− α), 1−α2
2−α ];
( c
1−α − 1, 1 + α− c1−α − F ) otherwise.
(A.4)
Comparing the manufacturer’s profit with the subgame where only M is in
the market (equation A.2), I find that the manufacturer is better off with




, piM |M = α − c ≤ piM |M&R = α; for α(1−α)1+α ≤ c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 ,
piM |M = α − c ≤ piM |M&R = 1 − 1+αα c; for α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 ≤ c ≤ α(1−α)α(1−α)2+1 ,
piM |M = (2−α)c−α(1−α)(1−α)2 ≤ piM |M&R = 1− 1+αα c.
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
If the retailer does not introduce R, I have
piEMR = 0 if c ∈ [0, α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 ];
piEMR =
α(1−α)−c
(1−α)2 if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1− α)];
piEMR = 0 otherwise.
(A.5)
When the retailer introduces R, I have




− F if c ∈ (α(1−α)
1+α
, α(1− α)];
piEiR = 1− α− F if c ∈ (α(1− α), 1−α
2
2−α ];
piEMR = 1 + α− c1−α − F otherwise.
(A.6)
The equilibrium retailer brand introduction strategy can be obtained by com-
paring equation (A.5) with (A.6). The retailer introduces R in equilibrium if
and only if c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤ max{1− c− α, cα}, or c > α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2
and F ≤ min{α2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α , 1− α}.
Note that when c < α(1−α)
1+α
, at the indifference curve, ∂F
∂c
= −1 < 0; while
when α(1−α)
1+α




= 1/α > 0. This indicates that the
likelihood of introducing R first decreases then increases with c.
There can be a change of the retailer’s brand introduction strategy at
(c∗, F ∗) with the change of α, where (c∗, F ∗) defines the indifference curve.
When c ≤ α(1−α)
α(1−α)2+1 the manufacturer’s profit increases when the retailer
chooses to introduce R (proposition 2.1). This implies that when the manu-
facturer’s profit is close to piM(c
∗, F ∗), piM may change if the retailer brand
popularity increases ((1−α) increases) and the retailer has a greater incentive




0 if c ∈ [0, α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ];
α+2c−1
(1−α)3 if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1−α)α(1−α)2+1 ].
(A.7)
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Comparing equation (A.7) with equation (A.8), I find that (A.7)<(A.8) when
c ≤ min{ α2(1−α)
2α2−(1−α)3 ,
α(1−α)
α(1−α)2+1}. This suggests that the marginal increase in
piR|M&R with (1 − α) exceeds the marginal increase of piR|M , further con-
firming the retailer’s increased incentive to introduce R when R becomes
more popular. Hence, at (c∗, F ∗), the manufacturer may benefit by getting
piM |M&R instead of piM |M with the increasing popularity of R.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
In a centralized channel, the equilibrium product introduction strategy is
obtained following the same procedure as in the proof of proposition 2.1 and
proposition 2.2. In the subgame where the retailer only sells M , the overall
channel profit is pi = αpEMM if EM is induced, or pi = p
EM
M if EM is induced.
Hence, in equilibrium
piEM = α− c if c ∈ [0, α(1−α)
2−α ];
piEM = c
(1−α) if c ∈ (α(1−α)2−α , α(1− α)];
piEM = α otherwise.
(A.9)
In the other subgame where R is introduced, in equilibrium, the overall
channel gets {
piEM = 1− c− F if c ∈ [0, 1− α];
piEM = α− F otherwise. (A.10)
The overall equilibrium product introduction strategy is obtained by com-
paring the profits in the two subgames. At equilibrium, R is introduced if and
only if pi|M&R ≥ pi|M . This is equivalent to F ≤ max{1− 2−α1−αc, 1− c−α, 0}.
Also notice that R is introduced to induce Ei from consumers. When R is
not introduced, the firm will induce EM .
I compare the introduction strategy of R with the one in a decentralized
channel, in which R is introduced if and only if c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤
max{1−α− c, c
α
}, or when c > α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤ α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α . Define
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the following regions,
A : max{1− α− c, c
α
} ≤ F ≤ 1− 2−α
1−αc, c < c1;
B : 1− 2−α
1−αc ≤ F ≤ cα , c1 ≤ c < c2;
C : max{1− 2−α
1−αc, 1− α− c} ≤ F ≤ α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α , c > c3;
D : α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α ≤ F ≤ 1− 2−α1−αc, c2 ≤ c ≤ c3,
(A.11)












α(1−α)2+1 ). Then in the regions defined by A and D, R is less
likely to be introduced in a decentralized channel, while in the regions defined
by B and C, R is more likely to be introduced in the decentralized channel.
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
When consumers do not conduct product evaluation, CSE = α − pM if
EM is induced, or CS
E = (1−α)− pR if ER is induced. When they conduct
product evaluation, CSEi = 1 − αpM − (1 − α)pR − c if R is introduced, or
CSEM = α(1 − pM) − c if R is not introduced. In a decentralized channel,
CSEM = max{α − c
1−α , 0} for c ≥ α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 . In a centralized channel,
CSEM = max{α − c
1−α , 0} for c ≥ α(1−α)2−α . Notice that CSEM ≥ 0 in a
decentralized channel when α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ≤ c ≤ α(1 − α); and CSE ≥ 0 in
a centralized channel when α(1−α)
2−α ≤ c ≤ α(1 − α). In both cases, R is not
introduced in equilibrium.
When consumers choose to evaluate both M and R, CSEi = α(1− pM) +
(1 − α)(1 − pR) − c. Recall that the retailer charges high prices of pM and
pR, which satisfy αp
Ei
M + (1 − α)pEiR = 1 − c to induce Ei. Hence in either
a centralized or a decentralized channel, CSEi = 0. Consumers choose to
evaluate M , if R is not introduced, and CSEM = α(1 − pEMM ) − c. In either
a decentralized or a centralized channel, the retailer charges pEMM = 1 − cα ;
hence, CSEM = 0. I summarize consumer welfare as follows.
In a decentralized channel, consumer welfare is:
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ [0, α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 ];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = α− c1−α if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , α(1− α)];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ (α(1− α), 1−α22−α ];
CSEM |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ (1−α22−α , 2α(1− α)).
(A.12)
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In a centralized channel, consumer welfare is:
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ [0, α(1−α)2−α ];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = α− c1−α if c ∈ (α(1−α)2−α , α(1− α)];
CSEi |M&R = 0, CSEM |M = 0 if c ∈ (α(1− α), 2α(1− α)).
(A.13)
Comparing consumer welfare in a decentralized channel with that in a cen-




1−α ≤ F ≤ 1− 2−α1−αc and α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 < c < α(1−α)2−α .
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
Without the introduction of R, the equilibrium is the same as in subsection
2.2.1. With the introduction of R, the retailer receives piR = α+ (1− α)γ −
c − F − αw if Ei is induced; piR = γ(1 − α) − c − F if ER is induced;
piR = min{ c1−α , α}−w−F if EM is induced; and piR = min{ cα , γ(1−α)}−F
if ER is induced. The equilibrium manufacturer and retailer profits are:
piEiM = α, pi
Ei
R = (1− α)γ − c− F if c ∈ [0, α(1−α)γ1+α ];
piEiM = α + (1− α)γ − 1+αα c, piEiR = cα − F if c ∈ (α(1−α)γ1+α , α(1− α)γ];
piEiM = α− c, piEiR = γ(1− α)− F if c ∈ (α(1− α)γ, (1−α)(γ+1)2−α ];
piEMM =
c
1−α − γ, piEMR = γ + α− c1−α − F if c ∈ ( (1−α)(1+γ)2−α , (1 + γ)α(1− α)].
(A.14)
Comparing the two subgames, the subgame perfect equilibrium is:
piEiM = α, pi
Ei
R = (1− α)γ − c− F if c ∈ [0, α(1−α)γ1+α ];
piEiM = α + (1− α)γ − 1+αα c, piEiR = cα − F if c ∈ (α(1−α)γ1+α , α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 ];
piEMM =
(2−α)
(1−α)2 c− α1−α , piEMR = α1−α − c(1−α)2 if c ∈ ( α(2−α)(1−α)(2−α)+(1−α)2 , c˜];
piEiM = α− c, piEiR = γ(1− α)− F if c ∈ (c˜, (1−α)(γ+1)2−α ];
piEMM =
c
1−α − γ, piEMR = γ + α− c1−α − F if c ∈ ( (1−α)(1+γ)2−α , (1 + γ)α(1− α)].
(A.15)
Here c˜ = max{α(1−α)2
α2−α+1(
α
1−α+F ), (1−α)2( α1−α−γ(1−α)+F )}. By observation,
∂piM
∂γ
= (1 − α) > 0 when c ∈ (α(1−α)γ
1+α
, α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 ], indicating that piM
increases with increasing γ.
Proof of Proposition 2.6:
When brand R is introduced by the manufacturer, the retailer chooses to
induce Ei, ER, EM , EM and ER from consumers. When Ei is induced, the
retailer carries both brands M and R. In other cases, the retailer chooses
to carry only the product that it plans to sell (M or R). Hence the retailer
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receives piEiR = 1 − c − αwM − (1 − α)wR, piEMR = 1 − cα − αwM , piERR =
1− c
1−α−(1−α)wR, piEMR = c1−α−wM and piERR = cα−wR respectively. In order
to motivate the retailer to choose Ei, pi
Ei
R > max{piEMR }, piERR , piEMR , piERR },
which requires that (2−α)c−(1−α)
(1−α)2 ≤ wM −wR ≤ α−(1+α)cα2 , wM ≤ 1 and wR ≤ 1
with c ≤ α(1−α)
1+α−α2 . Hence pi
Ei




When the manufacturer does not introduce R, it gets the same profit
defined by equation (2.4) in subsection 2.2.1. Hence, at equilibrium, the




and c ≤ α(1−α)
1+α−α2 . Com-
pared with the range in which R will be introduced in proposition 2.2, R will
not be introduced by the manufacturer but will be introduced by a retailer
when c < α(1−α)
1+α−α2 and 2 − 1α − α + cα2 < F < min{1 − α − c, cα}, or when
c > α(1−α)
1+α−α2 . Since the range of c in which the manufacturer introduces R is
smaller than the range at which the retailer will introduce R and the man-
ufacturer benefits from it (c ≤ α(1−α)
α(1−α)2+1), R is more likely to be introduced
by the retailer than by the manufacturer. Even when the manufacturer in-
troduces R, its profit may still be lower than when the retailer introduces R
when F > 2 − 1
α
− α + (1−α2)c
α2
. In summary, when the manufacturer intro-
duces R, its profit will be lower than when the retailer introduces R when
c ≤ α(1−α)
1+α−α2 and 2 − 1α − α + c(1−α
2)
α2




1+α−α2 < c <
α(1−α)




Higher Brand Popularity for R:
Consider the case when α < 1/2 and R is more popular than M . In a
decentralized channel, following the same analysis as shown in proposition 2.1
and proposition 2.2, I find that the equilibrium brand introduction strategy
is unchanged. That is, R is introduced if and only if c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤
max{1− c−α, c
α
}, or c > α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤ min{α
2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α , 1−α}.
However, the retailer’s selling strategy is different at high evaluation cost
(c ≥ α), where it will induce ER instead of EM . As a result, the retailer
receives piR = 1 − α − F and the manufacturer receives piM = 0. In a
centralized channel, following the same analysis as in the proof of proposition
2.3, I find R is introduced if and only if F ≤ max{1− 2−α
1−αc, 1−c−α, 1−2α}.
Hence the introduction strategy of R is different when c > α.
Consumer Evaluation Cost for Multiple Products:
Assume that when there are two products in a product category, consumers
incur a cost of c+ k (k > 0) to evaluate both M and R, or consumers incur
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a cost of c when there is only one product in the product category. When
R is not introduced, consumers’ reactions, the manufacturer and retailer’s
profits are the same as in subsection 2.2.1. When R is introduced, consumers
incur a higher cost to evaluate the products, and the manufacturer’s and the
retailer’s profit becomes:
piEiM = α, pi
Ei
R = 1− c− k − α− F if c+ k ∈ [0, α(1−α)1+α ];
piEiM = 1− 1+αα (c+ k), piEiR = c+kα − F if c+ k ∈ (α(1−α)1+α , α(1− α)];





1−α − 1, piEMR = 1 + α− c+k1−α − F if c+ k ∈ (1−α
2
2−α , 2α(1− α)).
(A.16)
At equilibrium, the retailer brand will be introduced when c ≤ α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2
and F ≤ max{1 − α − c − k, c+k
α
}, or when c > α(2−α)(1−α)
(2−α)+(1−α)2 and F ≤
α2−α+1
α(1−α)2 c− α1−α + kα .
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APPENDIX B




F (x) dx/F (v). Then equations (3.2) and (3.4) become
G(vˆc) = 4c and G(vˆd) = 8c respectively. A necessary condition to generate a
unique solution of vˆc and vˆd is that G(v) changes monotonically with respect
to v. Since dG(v)
d(v)
=




> 0 for v ∼ 0, G(v) is
increasing at least for very small v. Combining the monotonicity condition,
G(v) must be monotonically increasing to support the unique solution of
vˆc(vˆd).
Proof of Lemma 3.1: According to Taylor Expansion, when the convex-
ity/concavity of F (v) is small, that is f ′(v) is significantly small (f ′(v) ∼ 0),
and fn(v) ∼ O(f ′(v)), I may write F (v) ' F (0) + f(0)v + 1
2
f ′(0)v2 =
(1 − f ′(0)/2)v + 1
2
f ′(0)v2 (since F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1, I have f(0) =
(1 − f ′(0)/2)). Similarly, ∫ v
0






cally, K = 1− ∫ 1
0






When f ′(0) 6= 0, I can solve for vˆd and vˆc according to (2) and (4), which
gives
vˆc ' 8c+ 32
3
f ′(0)c2, (B.1)
vˆd ' 16c+ 128
3
f ′(0)c2, (B.2)
vˆd − vˆc = 8c+ 96
3
f ′(0)c2. (B.3)
Hence, vˆc, vˆd and vˆd− vˆc increase as f ′(v) ' f ′(0) increases; while vˆc, vˆd and
vˆd− vˆc decrease as f ′(v) ' f ′(0) decreases. More specifically, when f ′(v) > 0,
vˆc, vˆd and vˆd− vˆc are large; when f ′(v) < 0, vˆc, vˆd and vˆd− vˆc become lower.
Proof of Proposition 3.1:




. When vˆd < v ≤ 1,
pic − pid = v
4
− c − ( 3
16
v − c) = v
16






(vˆd− 8c) = v4 − 316 vˆd + c2 , and is negative if and only if v < 34 vˆd− 2c.
Since v < vˆd, this can only be true if 3vˆd − 4vˆc > 8c. When v ≤ vˆc,
pic−pid = 1
4
(vˆc− 4c)− 316(vˆd− 8c) = vˆc4 − 316 vˆd + c2 , and is negative if and only
if 3vˆd − 4vˆc > 8c. Hence the ex post profit difference can be negative if and
only if 3vˆd − 4vˆc > 8c and for v < 34 vˆd − 2c.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
Define E(pic) − E(pid) as the change of ex ante channel profit when the
channel structure changes from centralized to decentralized. For c > (1 −
K)/4, E(pic) − E(pid) > 0; for (1 −K)/8 ≤ c ≤ (1 −K)/4, E(pic) − E(pid)
increases monotonically with c. Hence E(pic)−E(pid) < 0 if and only if there









= − F (vˆd)
2
F (vˆd)− 8cf(vˆd) +
F (vˆc)
2
F (vˆc)− 4cf(vˆc) . (B.4)
When the disclosure cost is negligible (c ∼ 0), ∂(E(pic)−E(pid))
∂c
∼ −F (vˆd) +
F (vˆc) < 0, hence E(pi
c) − E(pid) decreases with the disclosure cost. When
the disclosure cost is high, c ∼ (1 − K)/8, ∂∆pi
∂c
is undetermined, indi-
cating that the ∆pi may decrease or increase with c when c becomes sig-
nificant. Therefore, when there exists a distribution F (v) that satisfies
K
16







F (v) dv) < 0 for c < (1−K)/8,
the decentralized channel can outperform the centralized one in achieving a
higher ex ante channel profit.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
When F (v) = vt, G(v) =
∫ v
0 F (x) dx
F (v)
= v/(t + 1) monotonically increases
with v, which guarantees the unique solutions of vˆd and vˆc. According to
equations (3.2) and (3.4), vˆc = 4(t + 1)c, vˆd = 8(t + 1)c and K = 1 − 1t+1 .
The ex post profit differences between the decentralized and the centralized
channel are expressed by









tc if 4(t+ 1)c < v ≤ 8(t+ 1)c;
−1
2
tc if v ≤ 4(t+ 1)c.
(B.5)
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The ex ante profit difference is the expectation of the ex post profit difference,
which is expressed by E(pic)−E(pid) = t
16(t+1)
+ (4(t+ 1))t(1− 2t)ct+1, where
c ≤ (1 − K)/8 = 1
8(t+1)
. Since 1 − 2t < 0, the channel profit difference
decreases with c. For any t > 0, the channel profit is lowest when c = 1−K
8
.






− 1), and is negative if and only if
t < 1. I also have d(E(pi
c)−E(pid))
dt
= 0 when t = 0.39, indicating that the lowest
value is achieved when t = 0.39.
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APPENDIX C
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
A credible disclosure strategy is made where the retailer is indifferent be-
tween keeping silent or disclosure (pir|silent = pir|disclose(vr = vˆr)).
(1) For v˜m ≤ v¯r < vˆr, pir|disclose(vr = vˆr) = vˆr4 − cr, pir|silent = v¯r4 . Hence
vˆr = 4cr + v¯r. Since v¯r =
vˆr
2
, it follows that the optimal vˆ∗r = 8cr.













(3) For v¯r < vˆr < v˜m, pir|disclose(vr = vˆr) = v˜m+3vˆr16 − cr and pir|silent =
v˜m+3v¯r
16
. Hence vˆr = v¯r +
16
3






Proof of Proposition 4.1:
The manufacturer’s expected profit conditioning on vr is:
(1) If v˜m ≤ 4cr, then E(pim) = 0;






(v˜m − v¯r) dvr = 116 vˆr(2v˜m − vˆr) = 125(v˜m −
4cr)(v˜m + 16cr);
(3) if v˜m >
32
3










(v˜m− vr) dvr. It




Now the optimal equilibrium disclosure strategy for the manufacturer.
(i) Assume that 32
3




when dm = 0, E(pim) =
v¯2m
16
. Hence the optimal vˆm = 8
√









dm = 0, E(pim) =
1
25
(v¯m − 4cr)(v¯m + 16cr). Equating the two profit at





21cm − 48c2r) with cm ∈ [44875 c2r, 643 c2r].
(iii)Assume that 4cr ≤ v¯m < vˆm < 323 cr. If dm = 1, then E(pim) =
1
25
(vm−4cr)(vm+ 16cr)− cm; dm = 0, E(pim) = 125(v¯m−4cr)(v¯m+ 16cr). The
optimal vˆm = 2
√
25cm/3 + 4c2r − 4cr, with cm ∈ [9625c2r, 44875 c2r].




(vm − 4cr)(vm + 16cr) − cm; dm = 0, E(pim) = 0. The optimal vˆm =
−6cr + 5
√
cm + 4c2r with cm ∈ (0, 9625c2r).
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
For cm ∈ [0, 9625c2r), vˆm ∈ [0, 8cr). If the manufacturer withholds infor-
mation, v˜m = v¯m ∈ [0, 4cr], then the best response from the retailer is
vˆr = 8cr > vˆm. If information is disclosed, then v˜m = vm ≥ vˆm. In












Similarly, for cm ∈ [9625c2r, 44875 c2r), vˆm ∈ [8cr, 323 cr). If the manufacturer
withholds information, v˜m = v¯m ∈ [4cr, 163 cr), then the best response from






cr ≤ vˆm since vˆm > 8cr. If information is







cr ≥ 25 vˆm + 325 cr > vˆm since vˆm < 323 cr. Otherwise if
8cr ≤ vˆm < 323 cr < vm, then vˆr = 323 cr > vˆm.
for cm ∈ [44875 c2r, 643 c2r), vˆm ∈ [323 cr, 643 cr). If the manufacturer withholds







cr < vˆm, since vˆm > 8cr. If information is disclosed, then
v˜m = vm ≥ vˆm. In this case, vˆr = 323 cr ≤ vˆm.
for cm ∈ [643 c2r, 1], vˆm > 643 cr. If the manufacturer withholds information,
v˜m = v¯m ≥ 323 cr, then the best response from the retailer is vˆr = 323 cr < vˆm.
If information is disclosed, then v˜m = vm ≥ vˆm. In this case, vˆr = 323 cr < vˆm.
This completes the proof for Proposition 4.2.
Proof of Manufacturer ex ante Profit





(vm − 4cr)(vm + 16cr) − cm dvm +∫ 1
32cr/3
v2m/16 − cm dvm = 148 − 2729 c3r + 103 cm
√





cm + 4c2r −
cm(1 + 6cr);









(vm − 4cr)(vm + 16cr) − cm dvm +
∫ 1
32cr/3
v2m/16 − cm dvm = 148 −
8
3
cmcr − cm − 1856225 c3r + 1627cm
√
75cm + 36c2r − 32225c2r
√
75cm + 36c2r;





(v¯m − 4cr)(v¯m + 16cr) dvm +∫ 1
vˆm
v2m/16 − cm dvm = 148 − cm + 800147cmcr − 4096343 c3r + 10001323cm
√



























It is easy to prove that ∂E(pim)/∂cm < 0 for smaller cm, ∂E(pim)/∂cm > 0
for larger cm and ∂E(pim)/∂cr ≤ 0.
Proof of Retailer ex ante profit
To calculate the retailer’s ex ante profit, I first analyze the retailer’s ex
ante profit at stage 3, when the quality of the manufacturer’s brand v˜m is
observed.
























− cr + 12825 c2r + 1625 v˜mcr + 150 v˜2m;
(3) When v˜m >
32
3
















(vr/4− cr) dvr = 18 − cr(1− 323 cr) + 132 v˜2m.
Consequently, at the second stage when v˜m can not be observed by the
retailer, the retailer’s ex ante profit is:


















r (vm) dvm. By calculation, E(pir) =
13
96





























r (vm) dvm. Hence, E(pir) =
13
96
− cr + 323 c2r − 204875 c3r − 12025(−6cr +√
75cm + 36c2r)
3.














−cr+26449 cmcr−240641029 c3r− 130441√3cm
√





















− cr + 323 c2r− 49√3c
3
2
m. It is easy to prove that ∂E(pir)/∂cr < 0
for smaller cr, ∂E(pir)/∂cr > 0 for larger cr. ∂E(pir)/∂cm ≤ 0 when cm ≤
8.17c2r or cm ≥ 643 c2r, and when 8.17c2r < cm < 643 c2r, ∂E(pir)/∂cm > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
(i) Assume that 32
3




− c; when dm = 0, E(pim) = v¯2m16a . Hence the optimal vˆ∗m =
8
√
ca/3, with c < 3a
64
c. It is not possible to credibly assign an optimal
disclosure strategy for any vˆm > a > v¯m >
32
3




(ii) Assume that 4c ≤ v¯m < 323 c < a ≤ vˆm. If dm = 1, E(pim) = 2vm−a16 − c;
dm = 0, E(pim) =
1
25a
(v¯m−4c)(v¯m+16c). Equating the two profit at pim(vˆm) =











The case of 4c ≤ v¯m < 323 c < vˆm < a is not possible.
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